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THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY
SEPARATION
STEPHEN LEE†
ABSTRACT
Migrants in the United States experience varying degrees of harm
related to family separation. This article focuses on the economic
dimensions of these harms by focusing on transnational remittances, a
topic that has generated significant scholarly attention. Within this
story, remitters are pitched as heroes and remittances are held up as a
critical, market-based solution for solving global poverty. Of course,
this picture is incomplete. This account ignores remittance-sending
countries and provides only a narrow account of law. This Article
focuses on anti-money laundering policies, an important set of U.S.
laws that regulate the remittance economy. Examining remittances
from this perspective shows that anti-money laundering and
antimigration policies form a joint project that regulates the
relationship between migrants and their family members. While
antimigration laws inhibit migrant mobility, anti-money laundering
laws create uneven opportunities for transferring wage earnings to
family members left behind on their journey. Recognizing the
connection between these areas of the law leads to the Article’s broader
contribution: identifying different ways that the law exacerbates or
mitigates the economic harms related to family separation. Specifically,
anti-money laundering policies help structure the conditions in which
migrants engage in expression of affinity across borders, thereby
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showing the intertwined nature of economic and physical harms within
transnational families.
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INTRODUCTION
A significant body of scholarship has focused on remittances,1
defined as funds or assets sent to other countries via formal channels
such as banks or money transfer services.2 Their story has been told by
economists, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists and it
goes something like this: workers, almost always migrants, send wages
to loved ones in their countries of origin.3 As these loved ones receive
an influx of capital and gain economic security, the economies of their
1. Although remittances originate within many countries across the globe, in this article I
focus on the funds or assets that are sent from the United States to other countries. While
remitters can share capital informally such as through in-person gifts, I focus on capital shared
through formal channels such as banks or money transfer services. See Abby Budiman & Phillip
Connor, Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean Sent a Record Amount of Money to
Their Home Countries in 2016, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/01/23/migrants-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-sent-a-record-amount-of-moneyto-their-home-countries-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/UQ28-SCLT].
2. See id. (stating that remittances exclude gifts and other assets of value that are given in
person or through informal channels).
3. See Nurith Aizenman, Mexicans in the U.S. Are Sending Home More Money Than Ever,
NPR (Feb. 10, 2017, 8:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/02/10/514172676/
mexicans-in-the-u-s-are-sending-home-more-money-than-ever [https://perma.cc/9MV7-A3ZY]
(reporting that the annual remittances topped $69 billion in 2016).
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home countries also benefit, with consumer goods purchased, houses
built, tuition bills paid, and investments made in small businesses.
Within this story, remitters are called “heroes”4 and remittances are
held up as a critical, market-based tool in the fight against global
poverty.5
This story is incomplete. For one thing, while scholars have had
much to say about remittance-receiving countries, they have had much
less to say about remittance-sending countries like the United States.6
We know a lot about the benefits that remittances produce for
recipients but know much less about the remitters whose wages prop
up this transnational economy. Such an omission might be
understandable except that remitters are often migrants working in the
United States, a topic of scholarly inquiry that has suffered from no
shortage of political or scholarly attention from immigration and other
public law scholars. For another, this account has provided a relatively
narrow account of the law’s role in regulating remittance channels.
Scholars have mostly focused on whether and how tax laws might be
calibrated to meet welfarist goals,7 an important conversation but one
that has not examined how remittances flow in the context of the
punitive laws that define domestic law enforcement policies.
This is an article about those domestic law enforcement policies.
In particular, I am interested in anti-money laundering laws, which
were designed to disrupt the flow of cross-border financial transfers
related to terrorism and serious criminal activity like drug or human
4. See Ricardo Guzman, Migrants Are Living Heroes / Social Distancing Flattens the Curve,
MEX. BUS. NEWS (May 5, 2020, 11:56 AM), https://mexicobusiness.news/policyandeconomy/
news/migrants-are-living-heroes-social-distancing-flattens-curve [https://perma.cc/TE4U-9XGM].
5. See generally Carol Adelman, Global Philanthropy and Remittances: Reinventing
Foreign Aid, 15 BROWN J. WORLD AFFS. 23 (2009) (discussing how remittances and philanthropy
supplement and influence government foreign aid); Richard H. Adams Jr. & John Page, Do
International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD
DEV. 1645 (2005) (finding that an increase in international remittances leads to a decline in
poverty).
6. For the most part, this scholarship has neglected the broader legal, political, and
administrative domestic context in which these wages are earned and remitted. One exception is
Cecilia Menjivar, Julie DaVanzo, Lisa Greenwell & R. Burciaga Valdez, Remittance Behavior
Among Salvadoran and Filipino Immigrants in Los Angeles, 32 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 97 (1998).
But even while Menjivar and her coauthors focus on the domestic elements of the transnational
remittance economy, their focus remains on the migrants themselves, see id. at 98, rather than the
legal and governmental actors charged with regulating this economy.
7. See, e.g., Shayak Sarkar, Capital Controls as Migrant Controls, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 799,
808–21 (2021); Ariel Stevenson, Recovering Lost Tax Revenue Through Taxation of Transnational
Households, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 100, 103 (2016); Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1, 37–40 (2008).
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trafficking. Banks and other financial institutions provide the
infrastructure for this transnational economy, and the anti-money
laundering policies, in turn, subject these institutions to a host of
recordkeeping and reporting requirements.8 Through these laws,
federal agencies can shape, constrain, and sometimes block altogether
remittance flows altogether, especially when remittances are intended
for recipients in countries closely associated with terrorist or criminal
activity. More broadly, these laws empower banks to make their own
calls about the kinds of international transactions that present a cover
for unlawful activity, leading to delays in completing transfers or
canceling them altogether.
These fluctuations take a particular toll on poor migrants who, like
most if not all poor community members, struggle to have their
banking needs met.9 Unlike tax laws, which regulate remittances either
at the point of earning wages (in the United States) or at the point of
consumption (in another country), anti-money laundering laws disrupt
remittance channels (the process by which funds travel from the
United States to another country). As a result, regulators and financial
institutions can shape migrants’ ability to remit wages for reasons that
are not always transparent and that can feel arbitrary.
Against this backdrop, this Article hopes to make two primary
contributions. The first is to demonstrate how anti-money laundering
policies work together with antimigration policies to create a system of
social and economic control over migrants in the United States. These
two sets of policies share common origins; rely on similar regulatory
logics, such as the use of private gatekeepers; and are subject to the
same pathologies, such as abuse in the form of surveillance and bias.
Taken together, this system of laws that governs both the flow of
capital and the movement of people enables a mix of public and private
actors to interpret and enforce laws in ways that are ad hoc and subject
to little judicial oversight. This flexibility is often justified by the nature
of the regulatory goal, namely the disruption of financial support for
criminal and terrorist activity, an undesirable and dangerous enterprise
that unfolds furtively and across national boundaries. But this farreaching enforcement approach also sweeps up innocuous behavior
like migrant remittances and empowers regulators and bank officials

8.
9.

See infra Part II.
See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 1, 138–39 (2015).
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to pursue goals in ways that don’t always bear an obvious relationship
to these laws’ anticrime and antiterrorist foundations.
Analyzing anti-money laundering laws as a set of rules governing
migrant economic opportunities clarifies and contextualizes the
underlying logic of modern immigration policies. The top four
remittance-receiving countries are Mexico, China, India, and the
Philippines.10 These are the same four countries where the demand for
migration opportunities far exceeds the supply, as reflected by the long
wait times for immigrant visas.11 This account reaffirms the observation
that people often experience the physical movement and transfer of
funds across borders as interrelated phenomena, a reminder of the
importance of “bottom-up” approaches to legal scholarship. At the
same time, centering anti-money laundering policies highlights how
regulators can use the interrelated nature of migration and remittances
to pursue a variety of regulatory goals. To take one example, President
Trump issued a travel ban to thwart migration,12 invoked emergency
powers to start a trade war (which may or may not have pressured
Mexico to agree to help enforce immigration laws at the border),13 and
threatened to constrain remittance channels to pay for a wall.14 While
the pace at which the Trump administration rolled out these policies

10. WORLD BANK GRP., MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
OUTLOOK
2
fig.1.2
(2019),
https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/
Migrationanddevelopmentbrief31.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJR7-9H8Q].
11. See Akila Muthukumar, Life in Limbo: Pandemic Policy and Immigration Backlogs,
HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://harvardpolitics.com/life-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/
28XV-44S3]; BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR
JANUARY
2021,
at
2–3
(2021),
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/
visabulletin_january2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKU9-ZTS3] (listing China, Indian, Mexico, and
Philippine wait times separately from bulk of applications).
12. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018).
13. See Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Mexico Agreed To Take Border Actions
Months Before Trump Announced Tariff Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/us/politics/trump-mexico-deal-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/
K5VK-J6RU].
14. See Bob Woodward & Roberta Costa, Trump Reveals How He Would Force Mexico To
Pay for Border Wall, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), http://wapo.st/236XOtH [https://perma.cc/
6NW7-KHMQ].
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was frenetic,15 that administration was not unique in its willingness to
mix and match these two sets of legal tools.16
This leads to the Article’s broader goal: to illuminate the quiet and
nonobvious forms of family separation that pervade the U.S.
immigration system.17 Within an immigration system that largely
prohibits unencumbered movement across borders, antimigration
policies disrupt a crucial means of maintaining emotional connections
across Westphalian space. It is tempting to write off these types of
harms as the unintended consequences of a legal regime created to
address existential threats like terrorism or morally repugnant
activities like drug and human trafficking. Under this view, the
disruption of remittance flows is an unfortunate but acceptable cost in
light of the social benefits of preventing mass atrocities.18 But an audit
of U.S. anti-money laundering policies should account for the full
range of costs that come with such policies.
The costs of these policies include disrupting or blocking remitters
from economically reaffirming familiar versions of love and affinity
expressed between and among family members: gratitude,19

15. See SARAH PIERCE & JESSICA BOLTER, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., DISMANTLING AND
RECONSTRUCTING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 1 (2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/publications/MPI_US-Immigration-Trump-Presidency-Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R9NN-BD5W] (“After pledging to take one of the most activist agendas on
immigration in modern times, the administration has delivered on nearly everything the president
promised on the campaign trail, almost exclusively via executive fiat, ignoring a Congress he had
originally pledged to work with on systemic reform.”).
16. See DEP’T OF TREASURY & DEP’T OF JUST., THE NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
STRATEGY FOR 1999,
at
58 (1999),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/money.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT6A-UL65] (recommending that the
president invoke his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to block
economic transactions where such transactions threaten the national security and economy of the
United States).
17. See Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2359–60
(2019).
18. See CLAY LOWERY & VIJAYA RAMACHANDRAN, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING POLICIES FOR POOR COUNTRIES: A CGD WORKING GROUP
REPORT
2,
15–27
(2015),
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-ReportUnintended-Consequences-AML-Policies-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6FC-CG65] (describing
the impacts that anti-money laundering policies have on remittance flows).
19. See RHACEL SALAZAR PARREÑAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION: MIGRATION AND
DOMESTIC WORK 83 (2015).
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obligation,20 guilt,21 and nostalgia.22 Many migrants come to the United
States knowing that a long-term separation from their family members
is likely to follow, and for this reason, rely on remittances to maintain
familial bonds for the duration of the separation. Economic
circumstances vary across migration trajectories, and for this reason,
remittances as expressions of affinity should not be romanticized. In
some instances, remittances might top off a recipient’s income, while
in other instances, such capital flows literally mean the difference
between survival and a poverty-induced demise. Despite the
differences in economic impact generated by remittances across
contexts, the common thread connecting these money transfers is the
familial relationship prompting and perpetuating the transfers in the
first place.
Part I of this Article provides a primer on remittances, the central
aim of which is to provide monetary support for family members in
countries outside of the United States, especially in the Global South.
Part II explains how anti-money laundering policies regulate the
transnational remittance economy. Specifically, I discuss how
regulators and gatekeepers exercise enforcement authority in ways
that narrow and sometimes outright eliminate remittance corridors.
These policies do not impact remitters evenly. Indeed, they exacerbate
inequalities that already exist on the basis of immigration status, class,
and race or national origin. This Part also shows how anti-money
laundering policies and antimigration policies form a joint regulatory
project impacting the lives and livelihood of migrants. Part III explores
how this adjusted descriptive picture—one that includes both antimoney laundering and antimigration policies—can help scholars
theorize the role that law ought to play in regulating the remittance
economy. Finally, Part IV examines economic expressions of affinity
in related legal contexts. Recognizing the economic dimensions of
family separation can help inform and shape debates in adjacent
contexts.

20. See HUNG CAM THAI, INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: THE CULTURE OF MONEY IN LOW-WAGE
TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES 70 (2014).
21. Allison J. Petrozziello, Feminised Financial Flows: How Gender Affects Remittances in
Honduran-US Transnational Families, 19 GENDER & DEV. 53, 63 (2011).
22. Susan Bibler Coutin, Being En Route, 107 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 202 (2005)
(describing the formation of hometown associations as a form of “practiced nostalgia” by
migrants in the United States). For background information on the role of hometown associations
in generating remittances, see generally Manuel Orozco & Michelle Lapointe, Mexican
Hometown Associations and Development Opportunities, 57 J. INT’L AFFS. 31 (2004).
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I. REMITTANCES AS ECONOMIC EXPRESSIONS OF AFFINITY
Although the subject of remittances has enjoyed significant
scholarly attention, especially from economists and social scientists,
legal scholarship has not offered much on the topic.23 For this reason,
this Part lays out the basics of the transnational remittance economy,
focusing first on macrotrends and then delving into some of the
qualitative aspects of the economy to highlight the social meaning of
remittances.
It would be difficult to overstate the global significance of the U.S.
economy, which generates more remittances than any other country.24
Of the 247 million migrants in the world, more find their way into the
United States than any other country,25 and unsurprisingly, the U.S.
labor market generates more remittances than that of any other
country.26 Recent estimates suggest that the United States sends out
roughly $67 billion to the rest of the world.27
Given the degree to which other countries rely on remittance
flows originating in the United States, access to capital features
prominently in U.S. foreign policy goals. These goals include fostering
the development of local economies or providing humanitarian relief
for disasters and other unforeseen crises. Within this context,
remittances provide a significant source of capital that is available to
advance broader goals related to fighting poverty or mitigating the
fallout from regional disasters. In this regard, remittances are no
different than foreign aid or assistance packages dispensed by U.S.
agencies. At the same time, remittances are different in that they derive
23. For some notable exceptions, see generally Sarkar, supra note 7; Stevenson, supra note
7; Rosser, supra note 7.
24. Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/interactives/remittance-flows-by-country [https://perma.cc/
297X-TXUD] (stating that $148 billion in remittances were sent from the United States to other
countries in 2017); see also Aizenman, supra note 3 (reporting that the annual remittances topped
$69 billion in 2016).
25. See Paul Adams, Migration: Are More People on the Move Than Ever Before?, BBC
NEWS (May 28, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-32912867 [https://perma.cc/NHR4-85ZP]
(explaining that the United States is the end destination for the largest percentage of the world’s
immigrants).
26. See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 10, at 4 fig.1.3 (noting that the $68 billion in
remittances that flowed out of the United States in 2017 placed it as the country generating the
largest amount of remittances).
27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-313, REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE
COUNTRIES: TREASURY SHOULD ASSESS RISKS FROM SHIFTS TO NON-BANKING CHANNELS 1
(2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-313.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB6T-DNL9] [hereinafter
GAO REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES].
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from purely private activity—wages earned and saved, and money
banked and wired—as opposed to funds collected in and disbursed
from federal coffers. Unconstrained by the limits and conditions
imposed by congressional appropriations as a source of capital,
remittances grow as the U.S. economy grows.
Not surprisingly, the difference in scale between remittances and
foreign aid is stark. Evaluated in absolute dollar amounts, remittances
that originate within U.S. markets amount to three times the amount
given through formal aid commitments by the United States.28 Debates
over remittances have focused on different metrics to evaluate the
significance of this transnational economy. Of course, the remittanceto-aid ratio fluctuates from country to country. For certain countries,
the remittance flow from the United States simply dwarfs the foreign
aid flow, while other countries have the inverse.29 Moreover,
remittance streams out of the United States do not flow evenly to
economies all over the world. Broadly speaking, Mexico, China, India,
and the Philippines receive more remittances from the United States

28. See WORLD BANK GRP., MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2016, at 17
(2016), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23743/9781464803192.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q37P-4GGV] (giving data on remittances compared with other resource flows).
29. Compare Mexico, for which remittances far outpace foreign aid from the United States,
with Afghanistan, which receives significant aid from the United States but a much lower amount
in terms of remittance flows. See UNHCR, REMITTANCES 5, 17 (2018),
https://www.unhcr.org/5b3101d44.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RHL-FHAQ] (explaining that in 2016,
Afghanistan recorded inbound remittances of about $431 million and Mexico recorded around
$28 billion); Max Bearak & Lazaro Gamio, The U.S. Foreign Aid Budget, Visualized, WASH. POST
(Oct. 18, 2016), http://wapo.st/2dy7GHO [https://perma.cc/7XTE-26SF] (explaining that, in 2016,
Afghanistan received around $1 billion in U.S. foreign aid and Mexico received around $45
million). The World Bank releases information on the remittance economy on an annual basis.
See, e.g., Migration and Remittances Data, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data [https://perma.cc/4ADTS5QX] (last updated May 2021). For a useful overview of the relative strengths and weaknesses
of this dataset, see generally Sandra Paola Alvarez, Pascal Briod, Olivier Ferrari & Ulrike Rieder,
Remittances: How Reliable Are the Data?, MIGRATION POL’Y PRAC., Apr.–June 2015, at 42. Both
government agency reports and scholarly contributions routinely cite this data. See GAO
REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 1 n.2 (citing World Bank data
for remittance statistics); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-65, INTERNATIONAL
REMITTANCES: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS AND VIEWS ON ENHANCED CUSTOMER
VERIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS 9 n.23 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-16-65.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK6M-LFBQ] [hereinafter GAO REPORT: MONEY
LAUNDERING RISKS] (citing World Bank data on remittances). See Stevenson, supra note 7, at
109 n.48 (citing World Bank quantitative data on migration and remittance flows). Given the
source material, a strong quantitative and economic streak runs through the remittance
discussions. See generally Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive
Less Foreign Aid?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1126 (2002) (conducting a study on the relationship
between corrupt governments and foreign aid).
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than any other country, in that order.30 These four countries amount to
about one-third of all remittances sent worldwide.31 In the context of
the countries with the greatest remittances flows from the United
States, consider the degree to which remittance capital outpaces formal
aid commitments. As Table 1 illustrates, the funds and assets sent to
these countries as remittances far surpass the aid packages provided by
U.S. agencies.
Table 132
RECEIVING COUNTRY

Mexico
China
India
Philippines

FOREIGN AID

$296 million
$51 million
$104 million
$167 million

REMITTANCES

$30 billion
$16.1 billion
$11.7 billion
$11.1 billion

The top remittance-receiving countries comprise a familiar group
to immigration scholars and lawyers.33 When examining wait times for
immigrant visas, these are the same four countries in which demand for
migration opportunities far exceeds existing supply, as reflected by the
long wait times for immigrant visas.34 These interconnected and
30. See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 24 (displaying this information in chart form).
31. See Budiman & Connor, supra note 1 (describing the global distribution of remittances
by region).
32. The federal government makes available information on expenditures sent to other
countries. All figures include data from fiscal year 2017. The foreign aid data is available at
foreignassistance.gov. I used the data available for funds that have been “obligated,” which
reflects funds that a government agency has applied toward some activity or program in the
recipient country. See MARIAN L. LAWSON & EMILY M. MORGENSTERN, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 20 (2019),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40213.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW9F-69PQ] (defining “obligations” as
“amounts contractually committed” towards foreign assistance). The 2017 remittances data is
available through the World Bank 2017 Bilateral Remittance Matrix as updated in April 2018.
Migration and Remittances Data, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data
[https://perma.cc/F89RPVQG]. 2017 is the latest year in which data for both categories is available. Id.
33. See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 24 (stating that $148 billion in remittances were sent
from the United States to other countries in 2017).
34. This has been especially true in the context of family-based green card petitions with
wait times swelling for would-be visa beneficiaries in Mexico and the Philippines. See BUREAU
OF CONSULAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR JUNE 2021, at 1
(2021), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_june2021.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z5AR-L3XW]; see also CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., GOING TO THE
BACK OF THE LINE: A PRIMER ON LINES, VISA CATEGORIES, AND WAIT TIMES 4 (2013),
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overlapping data points on capital flow and migrant mobility are the
predictable consequence of migration policies informed by economic
disparities between the Global North and South, and the historical
circumstances leading to this resource allocation.
Looking beyond these four countries, significant remittance
streams also flow into Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and the
Dominican Republic.35 These countries have also figured into modern
immigration policy debates further confirming the close relationship
between U.S. policy on setting controls over capital outflow and
migrant inflow.36 The degree to which the economies of different
countries depend on remittance flows can vary. In terms of gross
domestic product (“GDP”), remittances comprise 21 percent of El
Salvador’s GDP, whereas in China, remittances comprise less than 1
percent of its GDP.37 For obvious reasons, countries like El Salvador
are vulnerable to fluctuations in remittance streams while other larger
economies can afford to weather these sorts of swings.
Beyond these macrotrends of the remittance economy,
anthropologists and sociologists have deepened our understanding of
how and on what terms migrants attach social meaning to remittance
flows.38 Although an important, standalone body of remittances
scholarship exists, the broader literature on migration studies also
provides helpful insights on the meaning of remittances.39 Together,
this scholarship confirms that the remittance market arises within the

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/CIRbrief-BackofLine.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA6E-N46G] (noting the long wait times for visa applicants from Mexico, the
Philippines, China, and India); BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., supra note 11 (listing the wait
times for Mexico, the Philippines, China, and India separately from bulk of applications).
35. See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 24.
36. See generally Sarkar, supra note 7, at 806–08 (explaining that legal controls over capital
affect the movement of migrants across borders at both the international and state levels).
37. See Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – El Salvador, Philippines, China,
India, Mexico, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.
ZS?locations=SV-PH-CN-IN-MX [https://perma.cc/242N-F7XW]. Of the “big four” remittancereceiving countries, the greatest impact of remittances as measured by GDP is the Philippines for
which remittances comprise 9.7 percent. Id.
38. For a good sampling of an anthropological analysis of the remittance economy binding
the United States to other countries, see generally THAI, supra note 20 (retelling the stories of
various Vietnamese migrants and the role remittances and money generally played in their
experiences) and Coutin, supra note 22 (same, but with the stories of migrants from El Salvador).
39. This is not surprising given that a core reason why many migrants seek out opportunities
to come to the United States and other developed nations is to work for the purpose of remitting
some portion of their wages to loved ones. See LAUREN HEIDBRINK, MIGRANTHOOD: YOUTH IN
A NEW ERA OF DEPORTATION 44–47 (2020); PARREÑAS, supra note 19, at 53–54.
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context of transnational families—that is, families in which different
members live in different countries.
For this reason, the decision to migrate is often the product of a
collective decision-making process. The journey to the United States is
costly—both in economic terms and increasingly in terms of human
life—so a would-be migrant often must ask family and community
members to pool resources to invest in a migrant.40 Both lawful
channels like temporary work visas41 or unlawful channels like
surreptitious entry into the United States require significant
expenditures. And if saving and sharing resources cannot cover the
costs, families can take out loans to cover the rest. This decisionmaking
process can be complicated. While there might be a consensus within a
family over who should be the one to embark for the United States,
migration opportunities can be a precious resource to which many in a
family might want to lay claim. Decisions to fund a family member’s
journey to the United States can unfold the same way they do at
American dinner tables—awkwardly, angrily, intensely, and
sometimes leading to resentment even if the underlying motivation
behind these migration decisions is a sense of familial love.42
In this context, remittances function as a form of support for
family members.43 This money transfer can be used for a variety of
ends: to invest in human capital, such as by helping to pay for a family
member’s education;44 to start a business by providing seed money; or,
in many instances, to enable remittance recipients to meet their basic
consumption needs.45 Remittances also provide other less obvious but

40. See FILIZ GARIP, ON THE MOVE: CHANGING MECHANISMS OF MEXICO-U.S.
MIGRATION 68–71 (2017).
41. See Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 IOWA L. REV. 445, 460–
68 (2017) (providing an overview of the various costs and fees associated with applying for a
temporary work visa).
42. See, e.g., GARIP, supra note 40, at 68–70.
43. See, e.g., Ester Hernandez & Susan Bibler Coutin, Remitting Subjects: Migrants, Money,
and States, 35 ECON. & SOC’Y 185, 190 (2006); Menjívar et al., supra note 6, at 98; Bernard Poirine,
A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement, 25 WORLD DEV. 589, 598
(1997). Note that another strain of the literature characterizes remittances as acts of altruism,
which do not necessarily benefit family members. See generally Adelman, supra note 5 (analyzing
remittances as a type of foreign aid that reduces poverty in poorer countries).
44. See Lauren Heidbrink, Circulation of Care Among Unaccompanied Migrant Youth from
Guatemala, 92 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 30, 35 (2018).
45. See Jorge Durand, Emilio A. Parrado & Douglas S. Massey, Migradollars and
Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 423, 426 (1996).
One longstanding criticism of remittances has been that they do not always or even often offer
much return on investments in human capital because recipients are free to use remittance income
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no less important secondary benefits, such as access to microloans and
other financial services.46 Specifically, a steady flow of remittance
income can help remittance recipients demonstrate “credit
worthiness” in local lending markets.47 Thus, remittances both directly
and indirectly help alleviate poverty, and to a certain extent, foster
development in receiving countries.48
All of this points to the insight that remittances function as an
economic affirmation of familial bonds. Sometimes, scholarly and
popular accounts describe this family-affirming dimension to
remittances in self-serving terms, in which remittances function as a
kind of repayment for implicit loans made to migrants by their family
members.49 In exchange for supporting family members, remitters
receive goodwill and enhanced community standing. Popular accounts
portray remitters as occupying a position of respect and high standing
in remittance receiving countries. In describing migrants who send
remittances to Mexico, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López
Obrador described them as “living heroes.”50 In this way, the familial
bonds that cut across transnational boundaries remain dynamic and
emotionally fulfilling. As an economic transaction that reaffirms
familial identities, remittances are subject to market constraints in
on imported consumer goods, which undercuts job creation in local economies. See Charles B.
Keely & Bao Nga Tran, Remittances from Labor Migration: Evaluations, Performance and
Implications, 23 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 500, 502 (1989).
46. See AUDREY SINGER & ANNA PAULSON, FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR IMMIGRANTS:
LEARNING FROM DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES 1–2, 7 (2004), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/cr19.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJD9-NRKD].
47. See Maryann Bylander, The Growing Linkages Between Migration and Microfinance,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 13, 2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/growinglinkages-between-migration-and-microfinance [https://perma.cc/3LAR-97KE].
48. See DILIP RATHA, THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
POVERTY REDUCTION 5–6 (2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RemittancesPovertyReduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9QP-48HQ] (stating that remittances represent a major
vehicle for reducing the scale and severity of poverty in the developing world); see also Peter
Gammeltoft, Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 40 INT’L
MIGRATION 181, 190 (2002) (discussing remittances as a development resource).
49. See Poirine, supra note 43, at 593 (describing “[e]nforcement of the implicit loan
contract”).
50. Guzman, supra note 4. This is a common description across countries. See Eric J. Pido,
Balikbayan Paranoia: Tourism Development in Manila and the Anxiety of Return, in SOUTHEAST
ASIAN DIASPORA IN THE UNITED STATES: MEMORIES AND VISIONS, YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND
TOMORROW 31, 33–34 (Jonathan H. X. Lee ed., 2014); see also Rhacel Salazar Parreñas,
Transgressing the Nation-State: The Partial Citizenship and “Imagined (Global) Community” of
Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers, in GENDERED CITIZENSHIPS: TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION, POLITICAL ACTIVISM, AND CULTURE 98 (Kia
Lilly Caldwell et al. eds., 2009).
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ways that noneconomic expressions are not. Unlike words of
affirmation or endearing text messages, economic expressions like
remittances can dry up as labor markets shrink or shift and remitters
lose work. And while remitters can find other ways to remain
connected with family members, those family members who had
counted on remittance flows still have economic needs to meet and
debts to pay off.51
Other times, remittances are portrayed as economic expressions
of affinity between family members, emotional affirmations free of
market logics. In this account, the decisions related to migrating,
accessing work, and remitting wages all comprise parts of a larger effort
to support one’s family. In her ethnographic work on migrant youth in
Guatemala, Professor Lauren Heidbrink observes that family
members who remain behind in remittance-receiving countries might
see migration as an “act of love.”52 In this context, remittances “are not
anonymized financial transfers; they are infused with care and
commitment to . . . family. They have a face.”53 Similarly, in her study
of Salvadoran migrants, sociologist Leisy Abrego found that her
interviewees were often driven by desperation to provide for their
families who were living on the brink of poverty.54
None of this should be taken to foster an idealized vision of family
connection. These monetary transfers unfold across a range of
economic circumstances. In many cases, remitted funds represent more
than an electronic version of a hug or an encouraging pat on the back.
They also represent the economic culmination of a journey beset with
violence and long-term trauma for the remitter and a crucial financial

51. Often times, migrants take out loans to fund a single family member’s journey to the
United States and the failure to repay those loans can have severe economic consequences for
those still living in the remittance-receiving country. See Lauren Heidbrink, The Coercive Power
of Debt: Migration and Deportation of Guatemalan Indigenous Youth, 24 J. LATIN AM. &
CARIBBEAN ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 272 (2019) (noting that moneylenders in migration sending
countries sometimes confiscate land for defaulted loan payments). Remittances, like any kind of
valuable resource, can generate family strife, especially as family members suspect that remitters
are saving more of their wage earnings for themselves than for remitting. In this context, shaming
and guilt-tripping are common and probably similar to the kinds of behavior that arise within
native-born U.S. households in the face of financial disputes. See LEISY J. ABREGO, SACRIFICING
FAMILIES: NAVIGATING LAWS, LABOR, AND LOVE ACROSS BORDERS 60 (2014) (recounting the
experiences of a migrant who felt motivated to repay debts to avoid intrafamily tension).
52. HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 43.
53. Id.
54. See ABREGO, supra note 51, at 26.
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cushion against poverty and its associated economic and physical
vulnerability.55 For some, remittances are equal parts love and survival.
Both popular and scholarly accounts of migrants often paint them
as motivated by a desire to access U.S. labor markets, the wage
earnings from which prop up the transnational remittance market. And
of course, this is true—to some extent. At the same time, migrants may
feel compelled to provide remittances for reasons that arise after
making the decision to journey into the United States for unrelated
reasons. Disasters may strike different parts of the globe, causing those
in the United States with endangered family members to send
monetary relief. Using El Salvador as an example, many unauthorized
migrants in the United States were able to secure a form of immigration
relief through the Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) program,
which was a humanitarian response to the earthquake in El Salvador
in 2001.56 This relief maintained or improved the work opportunities
available to Salvadoran migrants, which in turn enabled them to send
some of their wage earnings to their family members coping with the
disaster.57 In other words, programs like TPS both directly stabilize
migrant opportunities in the United States as well as indirectly foster
support for regions affected by a qualifying disaster.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, while it is easy to fixate on
those remittances that are money transfers via banks and other
financial institutions, remittances can also be shared in person. Much
of the joy in giving support to family members comes from the human
connection fostered by gifts, be they cash in an envelope or paying for
a meal together. But remittances of this variety are mostly limited to
migrants with lawful status who have the ability to move freely across
borders. Migrants without lawful status or with temporary or
contingent forms of status like TPS generally cannot foster
relationships through traditional means of physical connectedness, like
spontaneous visits to say hello and planned visits to celebrate life
events.58 For migrants who face greater constraints in their mobility,

55. See id. at 52.
56. See Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 191.
57. This is one of the reasons that remittance flows are theorized as a countercyclical
phenomenon: flows increase as the economies of remittance-receiving communities shrink. See
Rosser, supra note 7, at 17 (“[E]ven where the shock is purely economic, there is the strong
possibility that remittances are counter-cyclical, providing additional resources when the home
country’s economy is not doing well.”).
58. Of course, technological advances like video calls also help maintain connections. See
HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 49.
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remittances via wire transfers remain the most viable method of
showing economic support to their family members abroad.59 Thus, for
the undocumented community, remittances allow migrants to maintain
an “absent presence” overseas in the businesses they help fund and
through the clothes and food their family members purchase.60
II. REMITTANCES IN A WORLD OF REDUCED MIGRANT MOBILITY
Legal scholarship on the remittance economy has tended to focus
on bilateral or multilateral legal arrangements grounding debates
within the context of tax law and policy.61 This Part highlights a
different set of domestic laws that regulate remittances, namely antimoney laundering laws. Drawing from criminal law and national
security legal traditions, these financial controls shape the kinds of
banks and financial institutions that are available to remitters in the
United States.
Centering the role that these laws play in shaping remittance
markets situates the remittances discussion within the economic and
legal realities most applicable to unauthorized migrants who have
resided in the United States for years and who often do not enjoy the
freedom of movement across borders. Thus, while remittances can be
construed to account for both transfers that happen through banks and
financial institutions as well as gifts and payments that happen in
person,62 for migrants with unlawful or tenuous legal statuses, bankfacilitated money transfers remain the only meaningful version of this
form of connection. Given that migrants frequently remain separated
from family members across borders for years and sometimes
decades,63 remittances offer an important alternative to physical
togetherness for reaffirming familial relationships.

59. In some situations, remitters can pay couriers to physically carry money and gifts into
countries on their behalf. See GAO REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS, supra note 29, at 9–
10; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (detailing reporting requirements for those carrying more than
ten thousand dollars into or out of the United States).
60. Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 202.
61. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 7, at 103–19; Rosser, supra note 7, at 28–41.
62. Anti-money laundering laws regulate in-person transfers by requiring travelers to
declare any amount of money in possession greater than ten thousand dollars. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5316(a)(1); FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FINCEN FORM 105, REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION OF CURRENCY OR MONETARY INSTRUMENTS (2017).
63. See Lee, supra note 17, at 2336–54, 2372.
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A. Anti-Money Laundering Laws and their Regulators
In the broadest of terms, the statutory framework undergirding
modern anti-money laundering policies developed at three distinct
moments. The origin story begins in the 1970s, as Congress began
focusing on the cover the financial system provided for drug dealers
and others who profited from illicit activities.64 Most notably, the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”) imposes recordkeeping and reporting
requirements on financial institutions as a way of preventing banks
from benefiting from the drug trade.65
A second key piece of legislation came in the 1980s in which
Congress began intensifying the penalties related to BSA
recordkeeping requirements. In 1986, Congress passed the Money
Laundering Control Act (“MLCA”), which criminalizes the act of
money laundering, with penalties in the forms of fines or imprisonment
for banks and other financial institutions complicit in the drug trade.66
The MLCA not only targeted banks for their role in facilitating money
laundering, it also enlisted the banks’ help in identifying suspicious
transactions that could be covering up or facilitating dangerous
behavior related to organized crime such as drug trafficking.67
Finally, the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act further expands regulatory
powers by imposing greater obligations on financial institutions to
collect information on their customers and clients.68 The existing
infrastructure was geared toward identifying “dirty” money that had
been commingled with legitimate funds. The PATRIOT Act added
new legal programs and goals designed to ferret out terrorist activity,
which presented a slightly different challenge. Money laundering
typically involves attempting to conceal unlawful criminal activity that

64. Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
797, 859 (2016).
65. Banks are required to report to agencies significant currency deposits, exchanges, or
withdrawals. See id.; see also Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash
Cycle: A Guide to the Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 232–35 (1991) (reviewing key
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act that are intended to thwart money laundering).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
67. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 861 (describing the MLCA approach to antimoney laundering policy as “regulators [relying] on financial institutions as reputational
intermediaries, requiring them to turn away potential money launderers, or face heavy
sanctions”); see also David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1359, 1409–10 (2007) (describing anti-money laundering policies as a system that requires
banks and other financial institutions to report to the Treasury Department “suspicious
transactions”).
68. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318.
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has already transpired for the purpose of washing away the money’s
criminal origins. By contrast, terrorist financing often involves money
with lawful origins being put toward unlawful and dangerous ends, like
terrorism. For example, wages that were lawfully earned and then
donated to a charity that turned out to be a cover for terrorist financing
did not obviously violate anti-money laundering laws at least as to the
donor.69 Against this backdrop, the PATRIOT Act requires banks and
other financial institutions to create and implement customer
identification programs—that is, to require banks to verify the
identities of anyone opening an account.70 The PATRIOT Act also
requires banks to report any “suspicious activity,” including larger
financial transactions.71
In targeting transnational financial activity, these policies
empowered a mix of public and private actors to carry out the fight
against dangerous activity supported and obfuscated by financial
institutions. The U.S. Department of the Treasury bears primary
responsibility for regulating remittance flows. Within the Treasury, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) sets policy
related to preventing money laundering and the financing of crimes
and terrorist activity through the financial system.72 The Office of
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), also within Treasury, enforces
economic and trade sanctions against foreign countries and other
entities, which can include stopping or capping remittance flows into
countries on the sanctions list.73 Both FinCEN and OFAC enjoy wide

69. William Vlcek, A Leviathan Rejuvenated: Surveillance, Money Laundering, and the War
on Terror, 20 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 21, 25 (2008).
70. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1412.
71. APPLESEED, EXPANDING IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO MAINSTREAM FINANCIAL
SERVICES: POSITIVE PRACTICES AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN
IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE 40–43 (2006), https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/100FinancialServices-ReportExpandImmigrantAccesstoServices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MVV68GQ]; ANNA PAULSON, AUDREY SINGER, ROBIN NEWBERGER & JEREMY SMITH, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF CHI. & THE BROOKINGS INST., FINANCIAL ACCESS TO IMMIGRANTS: LESSONS FROM
DIVERSE
PERSPECTIVES
35
(2006),
https://www.chicagofed.org/region/communitydevelopment/financial-access-for-immigrants [https://perma.cc/99ME-2CJV].
72. What We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/85K6-SCAE].
73. Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-controlTHE
sanctions-programs-and-information [https://perma.cc/Y742-LDBK].
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latitude and discretion in policy setting and pursuing enforcement
targets.74
Other agencies also regulate financial institutions that process
remittances, but their missions differ from those lodged in Treasury.
Most notably, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau targets
remittance transfer companies engaging in predatory economic
practices.75 But what distinguishes FinCEN and OFAC is how their
policies are embedded within broader criminal law enforcement and
antiterrorist legal structures. Regulators can use violations of FinCEN
rules as the basis of criminal prosecutions instead of having to settle for
less punitive outcomes in civil administrative proceedings.76 And the
OFAC sanctions list is meant to punish foreign countries and entities
who tolerate or harbor terrorist activity.77 This means that as a general
matter, FinCEN and OFAC enjoy a greater degree of freedom from
judicial review and public monitoring.
Finally, in certain instances, the president himself can freeze assets
or disrupt financial transactions through power created through
national security laws.78 The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (“IEEPA”) authorizes the president to freeze the assets of
individuals and groups that provide financial support to or otherwise
assist acts of terrorism79 on a finding of “any unusual or extraordinary

74. For example, the lack of transparency and judicial review surrounding “terrorist”
designations gives agencies like OFAC broad discretion to freeze assets of organizations with
putative ties to terrorist organizations even before an investigation concludes. See Zaring &
Baylis, supra note 70, at 1402–03 (discussing instances where OFAC froze the assets of various
Islamic charities).
75. Specifically, Congress directed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to ensure
that the terms and conditions surrounding these services are transparent and accessible to
remitters. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(c). Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1073, 124 Stat. 1376, 2060 (2010).
76. See BSA Records “Critical” in Conviction of Money Launderer in Organized Retail Theft
Case, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/caseexamples/bsa-records-critical-conviction-money-launderer-organized
[https://perma.cc/9PH6ESST].
77. See Press Release, The United States Department of Justice, Standard Chartered Bank
Agrees To Forfeit $227 Million for Illegal Transactions with Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Burma (Dec.
10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/standard-chartered-bank-agrees-forfeit-227-millionillegal-transactions-iran-sudan-libya-and [https://perma.cc/L48B-DUFC].
78. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. § 4305; National Emergencies
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651); International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified in scattered
sections of 50 U.S.C.).
79. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702.
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threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States.”80 Initially used to address threats posed by foreign
states and their governments, over time, presidents began evoking
IEEPA to address threats posed by nongovernmental entities like
terrorists and terrorist organizations.81 In the days following the
September 11 attack, President Bush invoked his powers delegated to
him under IEEPA to roll out an initial response to the attack.82 This
paved the way for Congress to formally recognize the president’s
authority in this context through the PATRIOT Act, which expanded
on the basic infrastructure IEEPA created and President Bush
invoked.83
B. Gatekeepers in the Anti-money Laundering System
In trying to craft laws that could address extraordinary threats to
the public security of the United States, lawmakers and regulators
developed approaches that not only targeted noncitizens and foreignborn individuals, but also enlisted the help of those well-positioned to
profit from the targeted behavior. These laws coerce both private
actors and intermediaries.
In the context of financing criminal and terrorist activity, financial
institutions such as banks play a key part in sheltering these illicit
activities. Federal regulators rely on banks to identify potentially
unlawful banking activity through their access to the banking activity
of broad cross sections of the economy.84 These laws also impose
recordkeeping obligations on businesses that are meant to deter them
from shirking their duty to monitor for suspicious activity.85 Most
notably, the BSA requires firms to keep records and submit reports
pertaining to activity deemed to be useful to a variety of legal matters
including those that affect terrorism.86 The PATRIOT Act not only
80. See id. § 1701(a); see also CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, IAN F. FERGUSSON, DIANNE E.
RENNACK & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 10 (2020),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7YG-F78X].
81. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 80, at 21–22.
82. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 31 C.F.R. 786 (2002).
83. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1395.
84. See Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 (1995).
85. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 860.
86. See id. at 871. At some later date, if a criminal is charged with engaging in drug sales,
bank records showing that members of the criminal organization were making frequent deposits
in small amounts can help prosecutors build their case. See Meltzer, supra note 65, at 233–34; see
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reorients financial regulatory tools to account for antiterrorist goals,
but it also significantly expands the types of financial institutions
subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. In addition to
national banks, the new requirements cover credit unions,
pawnbrokers, and hawalas87—basically any entity engaged in the
business of lending money no matter how minimal or informal.88 All of
these covered entities are obligated to file Suspicious Activity Reports
with the Treasury Department.89
As mentioned earlier, 1986 was a turning point for the regulation
of capital flows when Congress passed the MLCA. That same year,
Congress passed, and the president signed into law, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”). This was a major
legislative achievement, one that commentators sometimes invoke as a
potential guide to navigating the difficult political terrain that elected
officials face today in achieving immigration reform.90 IRCA amended
the immigration code to impose a set of verification duties onto firms
to ensure that they do not hire unauthorized migrants—that is, to
reserve job opportunities in the formal economy for U.S. citizens,

also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 351
(2003) (describing the process by which money laundering crimes are prosecuted). The
PATRIOT Act expanded the BSA framework to cover laundering crimes related to terrorist
activity. The BSA prohibits, among other things, using financial transactions to conceal “the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The statute, in turn, defines
“specified unlawful activity” to include various terrorism-related offenses. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(D);
see also Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1410–11 (describing the different ways that the
PATRIOT Act amended the BSA to allow regulators to punish money launderers for harmful
acts related to terrorism).
87. “Hawala” refers to informal money transfer systems organized around familial
relationships and regional affiliations. See GAO REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS, supra
note 29, at 9–10. Hawala originated within the Islamic and Arab economic context. See generally
Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the Hawala
Financial System, 12 INT’L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 405, 406–07 (2003) (explaining how “the
hawala system established itself as an efficient institutional arrangement” for “coordinating
economic interaction” in the Near and Middle East). While different regions employ similar
alternative remittance systems, the U.S. remittances literatures often uses hawala as shorthand to
capture all of these alternative systems. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL FLOWS
FROM HUMAN TRAFFICKING 56 (2018), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/
Human-Trafficking-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FGJ-ARVZ] (describing a British company’s
efforts to launder profits through the use of “local hawala bankers”).
88. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1411.
89. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 807, 869–70; Cuéllar, supra note 86, at 358.
90. See, e.g., Nicole Narea, What a Reagan-era Law Can Teach Democrats About Legalizing
Undocumented Immigrants, VOX (July 4, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/22557613 [https://perma.cc/779H-XCRD].
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green card holders, and other legal insiders.91 IRCA also requires firms
to begin keeping records, and in some cases, requires firms to submit a
worker’s information to federal agencies for verification.92
Both the MLCA and IRCA were legal intermediation strategies
designed to dry up opportunities for funding and work by leveraging
the United States’ massive global economic influence to deter the
proliferation of undesirable behavior. Pursuant to this logic, disrupting
cash flow can create structural consequences for criminal organizations
in ways that seizing profits or arresting low-level criminals cannot.93 In
the case of money laundering, the goal is to undermine terrorist or
criminal activity; in the case of migration, the goal is to deter
unauthorized migration for anti-humanitarian reasons.
The two laws share many features. First, like the MLCA, IRCA
imposes law enforcement duties on private intermediaries. MLCA
targets banks and other financial institutions while IRCA targets
employers and labor recruiters.94 Second, just as the MLCA imposes
criminal penalties on banks that refuse to carry out recordkeeping and
reporting requirements in good faith,95 IRCA similarly imposes
criminal penalties on employers and recruiters who knowingly hire
unauthorized migrants.96 Third, just as the MLCA has been criticized
for being narrowly construed to permit banks to avoid the most
punitive aspects of the law,97 IRCA has been similarly criticized for not
penalizing employers even where the facts strongly suggest that they
had reason to believe that their workers were unauthorized.98 Finally,
both regimes have been subject to criticism on the grounds of capture,
with prosecutors and agency officials rarely mustering up the resources

91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(b); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Private Immigration Screening].
92. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting To Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (and Why
They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 391–92 (2012).
93. See Mark Osler, Asset Forfeiture in a New Market-Reality Narcotics Policy, 52 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 221, 228–29 (2015).
94. Lee, Private Immigration Screening, supra note 91, at 1110–13.
95. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 861.
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(4), (f)(1).
97. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 861–62.
98. See Lee, Private Immigration Screening, supra note 91, at 1119–25; Kitty Calavita,
Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1061–64 (1990).
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or will to target high-level criminals, and opting instead to target lowhanging fruit.99
Indeed, during the 1980s, legal scholars described anti-money
laundering and antimigration laws as fitting within the same category
of regulatory challenge. As Congress was considering whether to enlist
the help of banks and employers in the fight against criminal economic
activities, legal scholars began taking on questions related to
gatekeeper liability. Put simply, gatekeeper liability sought to target
not just bad actors, but also private parties whose cooperation is
necessary for the commission of bad acts. Professor Reinier H.
Kraakman’s work on gatekeeping from the mid-1980s has proven to be
especially influential within the gatekeeping literature.100 Much of this
scholarship focuses on gatekeeping in the context of corporate
governance,101 but this idea eventually propped up scholarly inquiries
in parallel arenas, including for banks engaging in anti-money
laundering efforts102 and for lawyers advising firms.103 Importantly,
early iterations of gatekeeping scholarship also recognized the
gatekeeping’s applicability to immigration enforcement. Listing
examples to develop his idea of gatekeeping in a well-known 1986
article, Kraakman points to employer liability for hiring unauthorized
immigrants, which at the time was an idea embedded in a bill that
would become IRCA.104

99. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 209–11; Cuéllar, supra note 86, at 405–11.
100. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 61–66 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman,
Gatekeepers] (describing gatekeeper liability); see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 92 YALE L.J. 857, 888–97 (1984) (discussing gatekeeper
liability in the corporate context).
101. See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1707–08 (1985). This work also spilled over into other related areas such as
tax regulation. See Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37
STAN. L. REV. 889, 890–91 (1985); Alan L. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the Individual Income
Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429, 430 (1983).
102. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 8003.
103. See Donald C. Langevoort, Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?: Corporate
Lawyers Through Different Lenses, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2020).
104. In the article, Kraakman notes that employers would become gatekeepers “if they were
required to exclude undocumented aliens,” and then cites the 1983 Simpson-Mazzoli Act, which
eventually became the foundation for the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. See
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 100, at 64. For a modern application of the gatekeeping
concept to employers and unauthorized migrants, see Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of
Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 892–93.
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These legal tools, which foist onto private actors a degree of
responsibility over public-like duties, illustrate how such programs can
function in ways that are simultaneously coercive and empowering.
These laws are coercive in the sense that Congress and the relevant
agencies can punish employers, banks, and other intermediaries for
failing to keep records and to report suspicious activity. The
enforcement can be arbitrary both across and within administrations.105
And over time, enforcement decisions motivated or shaped by
arbitrariness or bias drain the obligations’ legitimacy.106
At the same time, the laws also empower firms and banks to make
judgment calls, thereby creating broad pockets of discrimination for
the private actors charged with these legal obligations.107 The standards
governing these duties can be vague and hard to meet and the
regulatory landscape can be vast, lowering the likelihood of audit and
inspection, which in turn leaves intermediaries with the flexibility and
discretion to act in self-serving ways. Large banks with a significant
transnational presence might have sufficient resources to cultivate inhouse expertise on complying with anti-money laundering
requirements, but a smaller credit union might turn a blind eye to
customers engaging in “red flag” activity.108
C. Blocking and Narrowing
Anti-money laundering laws formally empower regulators and
law enforcement officials and functionally deputize banks and financial
institutions to identify and separate those financial transactions meant
to facilitate or support criminal and terrorist activity from those that
105. See Cheryl R. Lee, Constitutional Cash: Are Banks Guilty of Racial Profiling in
Implementing the United States Patriot Act?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 557, 587–91 (2006)
[hereinafter Lee, Constitutional Cash] (suggesting that banks have engaged in discriminatory
behavior in implementing monitoring policies); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch
Between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 15, 49–50 (2004) [hereinafter Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State
Capacity] (noting the potentially perverse effects created by enforcement choices made by
regulators). For a useful overview of the various administrative difficulties related to
implementing anti-money laundering policies, see Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 1394–1418.
106. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1979–80 (2008).
107. For a helpful account on the equity implications of banking laws and regulations, see
generally BARADARAN, supra note 9 (detailing the different banking system experienced by
impoverished Americans).
108. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (requiring financial institutions to develop anti-money
laundering programs); see also Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 882–83 (noting that J.P.
Morgan has eight thousand employees working on anti-money laundering issues while smaller
banks will likely have fewer than ten people devoted to these issues).
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advance legitimate purposes like supporting family members in other
countries. The broad and sweeping nature of anti-money laundering
laws often leaves remitters with little recourse when remittance
corridors narrow or disappear.
In a common scenario, a remitter deposits money into an account
of a bank that has a transnational presence, which allows recipients to
access those funds at a bank branch in the recipient’s country of
residence. This is ideal in terms of ease and costs of access to
remittances. In a less ideal but still common scenario, a remitter might
still use a bank for initiating the remittance transfer, but the intended
recipient does not have access to the same bank in the recipient’s
country. Accordingly, a United States-based bank must wire the money
through sending services that can transfer that money to a bank that
the recipient can access.109 In one final scenario, a remitter may decide
to bypass banks altogether and simply wire the funds through a money
transfer organization like Western Union.
Anti-money laundering policies can disrupt remittance flows in
two ways. The first and most extreme disruption involves the outright
prohibition of the transfer of money through financial institutions.
Residents of countries subject to OFAC sanctions, for example, have
few options in receiving remittances from the United States.110
Remitters in the United States interested in transferring money to
residents of sanctioned countries must navigate a kaleidoscope of
restrictions. Sometimes remitters are subject to a transfer cap (as is the
case for remittances to Cuba).111 At other times, the restriction
regulates the type of remittance. Transfers to individuals might be
permissible while transfers to charitable organizations would not be—
at least not without procuring a license to do so (as is the case for
remittances to Iran).112 And where OFAC permits remittances, it

109. See GAO REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS, supra note 29, at 6–7.
110. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-297, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRIMES AND
SANCTIONS REQUIREMENTS 16–18 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-297.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MF3K-WAHC]; Sanctions Programs and Country Information, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programsand-country-information [https://perma.cc/R9YF-YUSR].
111. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a)(1) (2019).
112. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.550(b) (2020); see also 31 C.F.R. § 510.511(2) (2020) (imposing
similar restrictions on remittances to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).
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usually requires remitters to use a pre-approved entity to facilitate the
transfer (as is the case for remittances to Syria).113
The bottom line is that OFAC reduces remittance flows to a
trickle for countries on the sanctions list. A blunt regulatory tool,
sanctions certainly raise the costs for terrorists interested in pooling
donations and payments to fund their illicit and dangerous activity, but
such restrictions also leave members of those countries even more
vulnerable in terms of economic security.114 It is also unclear whether
such policies actually deter the financing of terrorism, or whether it
simply pushes such funding activities into other channels that do not as
easily lend themselves to monitoring, such as courier services and the
physical transfer of funds.115
Anti-money laundering policies affect remittance streams in a
second, less direct, but more broadly applicable way. Beyond the
blanket prohibitions that federal regulators like OFAC impose, the
broad reach of the policies also generate uncertainty and confusion for
banks in deciding which types of financial transactions trigger a
reporting obligation. Instead of bearing the costs of recordkeeping,
suspending, and then reactivating bank accounts after investigation
and reporting suspicious activity, banks can simply decide to avoid
these costs altogether by closing individual accounts, and in some cases,
entire branches. This process of “derisking” involves banks cutting ties
with certain types of customers and clients to avoid the costs associated
with regulatory scrutiny.116 In other words, a bank may simply decide
that maintaining risky customer accounts may not justify the associated
benefits and therefore decide to close those accounts.
This strategy helps banks mitigate risk, but it imposes social costs
by barring customers with legitimate banking needs who happen to fit
the profile of a risky client. Repeated and relatively modest deposits
from various locations in the United States to a common beneficiary
reflects economic activity that is consistent with human trafficking or

113. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL LICENSE NO. 6, NONCOMMERCIAL,
PERSONAL REMITTANCES AUTHORIZED (2011), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/
syria_gl6.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD2Y-563G].
114. See Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering
Regimes, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 45, 69–70 (2002).
115. See GAO REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 1–3.
116. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Executive Liability for Anti-Money Laundering Controls,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016).
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other criminal behavior,117 but such activity is also consistent with the
remittance activities of a seasonal migrant worker attempting to help
pay for a family member’s funeral in Mexico.118 In some instances,
larger banks have taken aggressive risk-management strategies such as
shutting down branches in regions associated with high-risk money
laundering practices.119 Finally, banks also close accounts for firms, not
just individuals. In particular, banks might want to avoid tarnishing
their brand by associating with money transfer organizations that have
attracted scrutiny or that have been penalized for facilitating criminal
activities.120
The disruptions caused by anti-money laundering policies can
exacerbate inequality in at least three respects. The first has to do with
unequal treatment built into immigration status differentials. As noted
earlier, although remittances can be shared during return visits for
many migrants, that is unrealistic. Individuals who travel outside of the
United States can deliver cash, dole out trendy commodities, and pay
for luxurious experiences for family members in person.121 But
immigration enforcement or antimigration policies make it harder for
migrants to move freely across borders. In a world of reduced mobility,
remitters are more heavily dependent upon the availability of financial
institutions for money transfers.

117. See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-A008,
GUIDANCE ON RECOGNIZING ACTIVITY THAT MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH HUMAN
SMUGGLING AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING—FINANCIAL RED FLAGS app. A (2014),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/FIN-2014-A008.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6UJPMLF].
118. See Heidbrink, supra note 51, at 273; see also Peter Benson, El Campo: Faciality and
Structural Violence in Farm Labor Camps, 23 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 589, 606 (2008)
(describing the life of a seasonal migrant worker, including remittance activities).
119. See, e.g., David Garrick, Border Banks Closures Prompting Feds To Review MoneyLaundering Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/sd-me-border-banks-20180227story.html [https://perma.cc/49YL-UHBT]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO18-213, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: REGULATORS COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL
STEPS TO ADDRESS COMPLIANCE BURDENS 1–2 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18213.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG5Z-QXT9] (discussing the regulatory concerns that led banks to
begin derisking).
120. See Press Release, The United States Department of Justice, Moneygram International
Inc. Admits Anti-Money Laundering and Wire Fraud Violations, Forfeits $100 Million in
Deferred Prosecution (Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/moneygram-internationalinc-admits-anti-money-laundering-and-wire-fraud-violations-forfeits [https://perma.cc/8JQ5NBFZ].
121. See ABREGO, supra note 51, at 143; THAI, supra note 20, at 152.
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Along these lines, the most obvious example is the intensification
of enforcement policies at the U.S.–Mexico border, which has curtailed
circular migration flows.122 Less obvious but equally important has
been the intensification of screening protocols at airports and other
ports of entry. Database screening protocols and No Fly Lists criteria
disproportionately impact passengers who are associated with or are
traveling to or from countries with significant Muslim communities.123
Because of the expansive architecture of database screening and broad
deference in regulating travel across borders, remitters who are
traveling—even those with secure legal statuses such as citizenship or
lawful permanent residence—must contend with uncertainty.124
A second way that anti-money laundering policies make it harder
to access financial services is by adding to the difficulties that poor
migrants already experience on account of their poverty. Outside of
the OFAC context, the Treasury Department does not dictate access
to remittance channels on a day-to-day basis. Instead, banks largely
make those decisions, and the disruptions to remittance channels
illustrate one of the dangers of relying on banks to support social
relationships.125 In her work on banking, Professor Mehrsa Baradaran
observes that “[m]ost banks, especially the financial giants, no longer
see their role as serving a community at large but view each customer
as a potential source of profit.”126 Unless banks prioritize the
transnational remittance economy (a constant but low-volume stream
of economic activity), increases in regulatory scrutiny can raise costs to
the point that derisking becomes a viable business strategy.
Of course, different types of banks can exhibit different risk
appetites. Smaller community banks, for example, do not have the
same resources to absorb large swings in compliance costs that can

122. See Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand & Karen A. Pren, Why Border Enforcement
Backfired, 121 AM. J. SOCIO. 1557, 1557–58 (2016).
123. See Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 668 (2017).
124. See Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271, 277–
84 (2008).
125. One GAO report finds:
Treasury officials . . . noted that in implementing BSA/AML regulations, banks retain
the flexibility to make business decisions such as which clients to accept, since banks
are in the best position to know whether they are able to implement controls to manage
the risk associated with any given client.
GAO REPORT: REMITTANCES TO FRAGILE COUNTRIES, supra note 27, at 27.
126. See BARADARAN, supra note 9, at 141.
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arise when a customer has ties to laundering schemes.127 At the same
time, large banks with established and recognizable brands have to
take into account other factors that can increase costs beyond
investigations and fines. Larger banks often have to consider possible
consumer backlash from providing banking services to clients with
lawful but controversial activities, such as religious organizations128 or
legalized cannabis.129 Within this banking landscape, poor migrants
often turn to money transfer organizations like Western Union, which
are subject to some, but on balance, less regulatory oversight.130 These
services generally require paying higher (and in some cases exorbitant)
transaction fees.131
Finally, derisking can also compound existing racial disparities
within commercial settings.132 Communities nestled near the U.S.–
Mexico border have been especially impacted by derisking. Several
banks along the U.S.–Mexico border closed those branches for this
reason, rendering those communities banking deserts.133 This impacted
127. See Ian McKendry, Banks Face No-Win Scenario on AML ‘De-Risking’, AM. BANKER
(Nov. 17, 2014, 4:11 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-face-no-win-scenarioon-aml-de-risking [https://perma.cc/4D92-RYX9] (quoting an officer at a small bank who
emphasized the importance of a careful cost-benefit analysis in this regulatory environment).
128. See Sheila Tendy, De-Risking Threatens Religious Access to Banking Services, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/de-riskingthreatens-religious-access-to-banking-services [https://perma.cc/YTX6-PTER].
129. See McKendry, supra note 127.
130. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Rules for Money Transfers, but Few Limits, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/business/new-rules-for-moneytransfers-but-few-limits.html [https://perma.cc/H3CY-2Y6W] (illustrating the costs immigrants
face using money transfer companies to send remittances to families living outside of the United
States).
131. See Stephen Wilks, A Complicated Alchemy: Theorizing Identity Politics and the
Politicization of Migrant Remittances Under Donald Trump’s Presidency, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
285, 288 n.11 (2017) (reporting that Western Union’s transactions fees exceeded $3.9 billion in
2015); see also id. at 302–04 (describing the payment system taxonomy and how the further away
from traditional banking, the more companies can charge vulnerable individuals large fees for
banking services).
132. A GAO report found that banks that closed accounts for derisking reasons did not do
so in response to federal investigations. Rather, most banks closed accounts preemptively for fear
of investigation. 80 percent of respondents indicated that they closed accounts to avoid the
potential legal consequences and monetary fines that come with facilitating money laundering.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-263, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG
THE SOUTHWEST BORDER HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR REGULATORS TO ENHANCE
RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEWS
18–19
(2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-263.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QSG-NNA8] [hereinafter GAO, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG
THE SOUTHWEST BORDER].
133. See GAO, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra
note 132, at 1; Garrick, supra note 119; Emily Glazer, Big Banks Shut Border Branches in Effort
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community banks and credit unions, which are crucial to local
economies.134 And because these communities have long been home to
Latino migrants—and the site of extensive and pervasive law
enforcement policies—the withdrawal of banking services piles onto a
broad set of exclusionary institutional practices. Indeed, banks in
communities with significant Latino populations might ratchet up the
screening process at the front end in order to avoid getting fined by
Treasury regulators. This creates biased disbursement of financial and
lending services and puts banks in an impossible situation. On the one
hand, banks must balance tightening up their banking services to avoid
being fined for facilitating money laundering; on the other hand, banks
must implement these screening measures in a way that is principled
and unbiased to avoid liability under federal civil rights laws.135
Given that financial controls in the money laundering context are
so closely tied to anticriminal and antiterrorist objectives, remitters
with ties to nations embroiled in these enforcement projects inevitably
have their rights hampered in predictable, if unfair, ways. American
Muslims and others with family ties to nations with significant Muslim
populations face the reality that their financial assets may be seized
with little legal recourse.136 Remitters to Central American countries
with gang-related criminal threats, such as El Salvador137 or
Guatemala,138 face similar kinds of uncertainty.
D. A Joint Regulatory System
Anti-money laundering and antimigration laws interact in various
ways that affect noncitizens differently. For example, citizenship or
lawful permanent residence confers on immigrants the ability to travel
across borders. As described above, those migrants who enjoy this kind
of freedom of movement will be the least affected by policy changes
that lead to the restriction of remittance corridors. So to the extent that

To Avoid Dirty Money, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2015, 8:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bigbanks-shut-border-branches-in-effort-to-avoid-dirty-money-1432598865 [https://perma.cc/5M5LGUCJ].
134. See Curt Prendergast, GAO: Banks Left Border To Avoid Fines, Now Face Renewed
Scrutiny, TUCSON (Mar. 24, 2018), https://tucson.com/news/local/gao-banks-left-border-to-avoidfines-now-face-renewed-scrutiny/article_57aef8ac-314b-5a06-af8d-7a039e9f62ef.html [https://perma.cc/
L264-5SJT].
135. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606.
136. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 67, at 14006.
137. ABREGO, supra note 51, at 133–34.
138. See HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 133–34 .
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political leaders and agencies can streamline or reduce hurdles for
migrants seeking to obtain a green card or to naturalize, migrants will
become desensitized to fluctuations in anti-money laundering policies.
In other instances, it can be much harder for the president and
agency officials to reconcile anti-money laundering policies and
antimigration policies. Consider, for example, the challenges that
President Reagan faced in the 1980s when trying to implement the
wave of new immigration laws passed as part of IRCA. At the time, a
significant percentage of unauthorized migrants had arrived from El
Salvador and faced uncertainty over their ability to remain in the
United States.139 Salvadoran President José Napoleón Duarte sent a
confidential letter to President Reagan imploring him not to remove
unauthorized Salvadoran migrants in the United States.140 According
to Duarte, the remittances generated by the hundreds of thousands of
migrants were critical to the country’s effort to rebuild its economy
after years of unrest and natural disaster.141 This exchange illustrates
how foreign dependence on access to U.S. labor markets provides the
president and the executive an important negotiating tool. The broader
context for this exchange also illustrates the degree to which
nonenforcement decisions stemmed from purely political
considerations rather than enduring legal principles. After rejecting
President Duarte’s entreaty,142 for example, the Reagan administration
implemented a policy of nonenforcement against Nicaraguans allowing
two hundred thousand migrants to stay in the United States rather than
be forced to return to a country and face dangerous conditions. While
Nicaraguans and Salvadorans faced similar dangers at home, the
Nicaraguan nonenforcement policy better aligned with U.S. anticommunist foreign policy goals at the time.
Congress eventually created the legal category of TPS (passed as
a part of the Immigration Act of 1990) to help provide relief to
Salvadoran migrants in the United States and more generally provided
a more principled basis upon which relief might be provide where

139.
140.
141.

PEDERSEN, supra note 137, at 138.
Id.
See id.; see also Robert Pear, Duarte Appeals to Reagan To Let Salvadorans Stay, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/26/world/durate-appeals-to-reagan-tolet-salvadorans-stay.html [https://perma.cc/J2WR-NJM8].
142. Robert Pear, Reagan Rejects Salvadoran Plea On Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1987, at A1.
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migrants faced dangerous conditions abroad.143 While the story of
Salvadoran relief often is discussed within the context of the Sanctuary
movement,144 it is unquestionably a key inflection point in social
movements and activism in the immigration context. The backdrop of
Reagan-era policies concerning immigration, money laundering, and
foreign policy demonstrates how remittance flows figured into the
calculus for regulating the lives and livelihood of migrants in the
United States.145
Closely analyzing how antimigration and anti-money laundering
policies interact to jointly regulate migrant lives illustrates that the law
governing remittances is much broader than what has been canvassed.
In other words, these policies work together to regulate the lives and
the livelihood of migrants. Much of the existing legal scholarship
addressing remittances focuses on tax laws that shape the incentives of
the different parties propping up the transnational remittance
economy.146 Legal scholars often focus on the tax implications of the

143. See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-andasylum-policy-reagan-era [https://perma.cc/X2ZP-5G67].
144. See SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM AND
THE U.S. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 223–28 (1993).
145. Elected officials and regulators can reconcile these policies in ways other than by dialing
down enforcement efforts. For example, President Trump threatened to ratchet up enforcement
efforts against money transfer companies, using the threat of disruption to remittance flows for
political gain. For example, early in his presidency, President Trump threatened to extend the
“know your customer” rule to money transfer companies like Western Union unless Mexican
officials did not agree to fund the construction of a wall on the U.S.–Mexico border. See Vanda
Felbab-Brown, The Wall: The Real Costs of a Barrier Between the United States and Mexico,
BROOKINGS (Aug. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/article/the-wall-the-real-costs-of-a-barrierbetween-the-united-states-and-mexico [https://perma.cc/DB56-MWBM]. In the days leading up
to the 2020 election, the Trump administration issued a new regulation that prohibited Cuban
entities with military ties from processing remittances, Press Release, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Treasury Prohibits Cuban Military from Processing Remittance-Related Transactions
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1164 [https://perma.cc/NU3XZQQA]; see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.421(a)(7) (excluding from the definition of “transaction[s]
ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction” a “transaction relating to the collection, forwarding,
or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the Cuba Restricted
List”), thereby causing Western Union to shut down several businesses in Cuba, Kirk Semple,
Cuba Says Restrictions Will Force Western Union Offices To Close, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/world/americas/cuba-western-union-remittances.html
[https://perma.cc/U9XD-QZ9G].
146. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 103–19 (analyzing benefits and costs of taxing
remittances in receiving countries); Alberto Simpser, Lauren Duquette-Rury, José Antonio
Hernández Company & Juan Fernando Ibarra, The Political Economy of Social Spending by
Local Government, 51 LATIN AM. RSCH. REV. 62, 71–77 (2016) (analyzing the impacts of
Mexico’s remittance “matching” program as an incentive for cross-border financial flows).
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remittance economy and have exhibited concerns with policies that
treat remitters fairly.147 Aside from fairness concerns, tax laws also
impede the goal of reducing global poverty, a widely recognized benefit
of remittance flows.148 Just as important are domestic enforcement laws
imbued with a moral agenda often associated with criminal and
national security law. This is important not just because we have a
clearer understanding of the full range of laws regulating remittances
but also because we must grapple with a broader range of interests that
make it hard to develop a coherent set of normative commitments.
Anti-money laundering policies present conceptual and
implementation challenges that are distinct from the tax laws that
receive scholarly attention. First, at the conceptual level, discussions of
fairness in the tax context often involve debates about changing
policies within at least two countries—the country in which the
remittances originated, and the country in which remittances are
received. Arguing in favor of a single taxation system means having to
justify why one country should receive the taxation benefit but not the
other. By contrast, anti-money laundering policies are characterized by
a high degree of unilateralism compared to other controls over capital
flows. Instead of tax treaties binding the United States and partner
countries,149 the Treasury Department can simply place countries on a
sanctions list or constrict remittance flows through a mix of civil and
criminal investigations.150 Unlike bilateral and multilateral legal
agreements, which can be difficult to forge and costly to ignore or
invalidate, federal officials and regulators can usually implement antimoney laundering policies as a matter of prosecutorial discretion and
without the input of transnational stakeholders.151
147. In particular, these scholars have trained their attention on the problems of double
taxation and the unfairness that comes from forcing a wage earner to have to pay into two
governance systems in different countries. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 145–48; Ruth Mason,
Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 1610 (2009); Rosser, supra
note 7.
148. Professor Ezra Rosser argues that transaction barriers should be lowered to enable
remittances to realize anti-poverty goals. In his estimation, “[t]he greatest potential regulatory
threat to remittances is remittance taxation.” Rosser, supra note 7, at 37.
149. See Mason, supra note 147, at 1567 (describing the difficulties of amending tax treaties).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) (describing a range of civil penalties for using financial
instruments for money laundering purposes); 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b) (describing a range of criminal
penalties for related violations of law); cf. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 840–43 (proposing
noncompliance penalties and affirmative incentives to comply with reporting requirements
imposed by anti-money laundering laws).
151. See Cuéllar, supra note 86, at 337, 353–54, 357, 362–63 (discussing prosecutorial and
regulatory discretion under anti-money laundering laws).
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The unilateral nature of anti-money laundering and antimigration
enforcement policies allows the executive to toggle between these two
sets of laws to achieve a system of migration control. In this regard, the
laws that regulators can use between and across contexts extends
observations that other legal scholars have made about the modern
immigration enforcement system. Professor David Sklansky observes
that agency officials routinely toggle back and forth between
immigration and criminal laws to punish noncitizens, thus creating an
enforcement regime grounded in principles of “ad hoc
instrumentalism,” in which pragmatic and outcome-oriented
considerations take precedence over respect of formal legal
categories.152 In a related vein, Professor Jennifer Chacón highlights
the way that these converging and all-encompassing regimes place
noncitizens in a state of “liminal legality” in which no degree of lawful
status truly guarantees noncitizens a reprieve against the destabilizing
effects of law.153 This same dynamic characterizes the regulation of
financial institutions and flows in the antiterrorist context.
To be clear, agency officials do face some limitations in the
exercise of their discretionary authority. Three limits in particular
come to mind. First, while the discretion of executive officials—of the
president, political appointees, and civil servants—is broad with
regards to unauthorized migrants, they have less latitude with lawful
permanent residents and even less with citizens.154 Second, decisions
made by regulators and their proxies (like employers and the local law
enforcement officials) that transpire within the interior are subject to
greater statutory and constitutional constraints than those transpiring
wholly outside of the country. Enforcing immigration laws against
workers must be reconciled with basic workplace protections.155 Many
labor and employment laws cover workers irrespective of immigration

152. David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 157, 197, 201–02 (2012); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through
Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 139–47 (2009) (noting the prevalence of using criminal
law and actors to address unauthorized migration without providing the procedural protections
of criminal proceedings).
153. Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 709, 730–31
(2015).
154. Admittedly, government officials have more latitude over citizens when enforcing laws
at the border as well as with banking.
155. See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 348 (2001) (noting the
inherent conflict between IRCA and workplace protection laws).
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status,156 which means migrants may be able to bring claims for wage
and hour, workplace safety, or antidiscrimination violations on the
basis of work they were not entitled to undertake in the first place.157
Decisions to stop and frisk or arrest migrants is also subject to
constitutional protections. By contrast, foreign aid disbursement
decisions are reviewed under the much more deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard.158 Finally, the president and the relevant agencies
enjoy limited control over which countries ultimately receive the
remittances by virtue of the private nature of the transfer of funds and
assets.159
Still, the larger point is that structural realities and constitutional
doctrine confer a comparative advantage in terms of possessing the
unilateral flexibility to enforce immigration and national security laws,
at least when considering the alternative of conventional foreign aid
channels through bilateral arrangements. The ability to disrupt the
flow of people and capital gives agencies, and the president more
generally, flexibility in attempting to disrupt criminal and terrorist
activities. This is a hallmark of modern immigration enforcement
policies.160
All of this created an immigration system that offers agencies a
wide array of tools nested within malleable concepts of crime control
and national security. Political and legal actors are incentivized to
enforce anti-money laundering laws to signal to the public their
commitment to eradicating harmful activities like trafficking and
156. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (holding that undocumented
workers are protected by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (including undocumented workers within the meaning of “employee”
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 705 (11th
Cir. 1988) (holding that undocumented workers should be considered “employees” under the Fair
Labor Standards Act).
157. See Nessel, supra note 155, at 349 (arguing that “immigration law is enforced and
interpreted in such a way as to render any NLRA remedies meaningless for aggrieved workers
who lack proper immigration status”).
158. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 493–94
(2014) (describing foreign hard look review, which determines whether an agency action is
arbitrary or capricious).
159. See Dilip Ratha, Remittances: Funds for the Folks Back Home, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(Feb. 24, 2020), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/remitt.htm [https://perma.cc/
N4X4-AV7B] (stating that “[i]t is hard to estimate the exact size of remittance flows because
many transfers take place through unofficial channels”); see also Rosser, supra note 7, at 13
(stating that remittances are primarily used to support the basic needs of family abroad).
160. See Sklansky, supra note 152, at 201–04 (arguing that modern immigration enforcement
and national security practices are characterized by flexibility, a phenomenon that Sklansky terms
“ad hoc instrumentalism”).
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terrorism. Whether or not enforcement decisions actually accomplish
deterrence or other legitimate enforcement goals is less important than
giving administrators the ability to point to concrete instances of
punishing bad actors, even if they are not the most deserving of
punishment.161
E. Deference to Enforcement Decisions
As antiterrorism projects, both antimigration and anti-money
laundering laws often receive significant deference from courts, which
confers wide latitude upon federal officials in setting polices. Like
other social and economic problems folded into the umbrella of
national security challenges, policies in these arenas often get the
benefit of broad discretionary powers and judicial deference. Scholars
often criticize the many social and economic costs that come with such
an arrangement. As is the case in the immigration enforcement
context, national security justifications often make it difficult to
challenge anti-money laundering policies.
On the antimigration enforcement side, courts are highly
deferential when officials defend regulatory actions on national
security grounds, which leaves noncitizens with little judicial recourse
and raises the risks of error or abuse.162 This dynamic applies to both
standard immigration law problems as well as to remittance-related
problems. The most notable thing here is that those accused of
engaging in terrorist activity have limited procedural rights.163 Without
meaningful notice or a hearing, this adjudicatory system creates the
risk of mistaken convictions and removals and invites abuse by
executive officials. This is one of the main contributions of the court
system: the threat of generous discovery laws deters institutional actors
like the federal government from engaging in potentially unlawful or
embarrassing behavior. Here, courts have intervened in only measured

161. See Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity, supra note 105, at
44; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1865–75 (2007).
162. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 104 (2015). Dean Kerry Abrams has argued that
while courts still defer to Executive decisions grounded in national security rationales, the
growing recognition of familial relationships provide one potential basis for reining in this
deference. See Kerry Abrams, Family Reunification and the Security State, 32 CONST. COMMENT.
247, 248–50 (2017).
163. See Chacón, supra note 161, at 1871–72 (describing the curtailed constitutional rights for
migrants in the national security enforcement context).
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ways.164 This system, which proceeds without the full array of
information-producing measures typically offered by courts, creates
the risk of erroneous or abusive decisions. A long string of immigration
decisions from the Cold War era165 and the post-September 11 era166
demonstrate the Supreme Court’s willingness to defer to immigration
officials when national security justifications are offered. Moreover,
the relatively uneventful and inconsequential postscripts that followed
those decisions cast doubt on the veracity, or at least the depth, of the
government’s asserted concerns with national security.
All of this provides a more complete picture of how intentionally
broad and vague conceptions of public security frame and justify
policies that impact migrants in the United States. Laws that empower
immigration officials to identify, detain, and expel migrants with little
judicial oversight arise from the same legislative spring as the laws that
enable financial regulators to flag, reroute, and disrupt financial flows.
Drawing this connection between these two regulatory arenas also
illustrates the range of legal tools available to elected and bureaucratic
officials in managing relations with other countries. Indeed, a common
set of themes binds the scholarly discourse in each of these areas. In
terms of migration scholarship, legal scholars focus on how national
security laws have reduced the civil liberties of migrants and those who
appear to be migrants,167 observing that these reductions are allocated
in discriminatory ways.168 Abuse by executive officials, enabled by
broad doctrines of deference, has preoccupied this discussion with an
eye toward the harms that have been exacted upon migrant bodies.169
The concurrent rise of “criminal aliens” and “terrorists” to foster a
“public security” state shows how the harms exacted upon migrant
164. See Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 991, 1047–49 (2018).
165. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 580 (1952); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 537 (1950); Jennifer Gordon,
Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the Constitution,
93 IND. L.J. 653, 664–65, 706 (2018); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
559 (1990).
166. See Kerry, 576 U.S. at 106. For an argument that the Court exhibits less deference to the
political branches when family unification claims are involved, see Abrams, supra note 162, at
269–79.
167. See Chacón, supra note 161, at 1850–56.
168. See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International”
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1363–66 (2019).
169. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1562–71 (2009).
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bodies is intertwined with the constraints placed on migrants’
livelihoods—the money they earn, share, and transfer.
On the financial regulation side, legal scholars have also argued
that the law in this area engenders abuse, both by regulators as well as
by private intermediaries enlisted into the project of surveilling and
reporting.170 But this abuse has been largely tied to critiques of the
arbitrariness of decision-making and the confusion surrounding the
legal obligations that these laws impose on private actors. Embedding
financial controls like anti-money laundering laws within a broader
system that aims to protect U.S. citizens by controlling the migration
and mobility of noncitizens illustrates the broader stakes tied up in the
freezing of assets. And while impeding the ability of individuals to send
money overseas through financial institutions may not generate harms
that are as severe or drastic as physical imprisonment, the harms
associated with financial immobility stem from the same impulse to
neutralize foreign threats even in the absence of firm information. In
this regard, the desire to disrupt financial channels fits into a larger
regulatory project that relies on the dehumanization of its targets—the
treatment of migrants as criminals and terrorists and remitters as
financiers and unwitting lemmings.
Although broad doctrines of deference give the executive
significant room to go it alone within the antimigration and anti-money
laundering policy arenas, recent years produced some notable
instances of bilateral cooperation. Both the Obama and Trump
administrations engaged in “border externalization” strategies, which
enlist the help of other countries to deter migration flows at the U.S.–
Mexico border.171 The Alliance for Prosperity Plan, for example,
provides funds to countries in the “Northern Triangle” in Central
America in exchange for, among other things, increased enforcement
against money laundering and cash smuggling, along with other
criminal activity associated with unlawful migration.172 And migration
170. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 70, at 1394–1418; Lee, Constitutional Cash, supra note
105, at 598.
171. See Ana Muñiz, Bordering Circuitry: Crossjurisdictional Immigration Surveillance, 66
UCLA L. REV. 1636, 1650–55 (2019); Cecilia Menjívar, Immigration Law Beyond Borders:
Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization, 10 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 353, 357–60 (2014).
172. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Support for the Alliance for Prosperity
in the Northern Triangle (Mar. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/03/03/fact-sheet-support-alliance-prosperity-northern-triangle [https://perma.cc/HQU5ASLV]; Jennifer Fowler, Treasury Participates in Latin American Financial Action Task Force
Meetings Focused on Combatting Illicit Finance, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 17, 2015),
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protection protocols, such as the “Remain in Mexico” policy, require
U.S. immigration officials to work with their counterparts in the
Mexican government to manage the population of asylum seekers.173
Yet these plans confirm the broader point about unilateralism.
This broad power combined with the economic influence of the United
States gives the executive leverage in setting favorable terms in
bilateral agreements. Both the Alliance for Prosperity Plan and the
Remain in Mexico policy advance a mix of antimigration and antimoney laundering policies in ways that reduce costs for regulators even
if they might also increase human costs in other ways. In other contexts,
developing nations have been able to gain leverage in setting the terms
of bilateral agreements with developed nations, but those instances
have been rare, and in any event, have not yet transpired within the
context of the United States.174
III. THEORIZING THE LAW REGULATING REMITTANCES
Thus far, I have tried to make two points: (1) remittances function
as a kind of economic expression of affinity between family members;
and (2) anti-money laundering laws work in conjunction with
antimigration laws to foster a system of long-term and normalized
family separation. These two points provide some descriptive clarity on

https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Fowler-Latin-American-GAFILAT.aspx [https://
perma.cc/KX86-MHFQ]; see also 2 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENF’T AFFS., U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING
24
(2020),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Tab-2-INCSR-Vol-2-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MLW4-GWKU] (noting that El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all present
vulnerabilities within a broader anti-money laundering strategy). The Alliance for Prosperity Plan
also imposes conditions on participating countries to better develop their economies and legal
and political institutions to address push factors of migration. See Dawn Paley, Obama’s Central
American Rescue Plan Will Only Make Life There Worse, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/120962 [https://perma.cc/TT9Q-PVCK].
173. See ARIEL G. RUIZ SOTO, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., ONE YEAR AFTER THE U.S.MEXICO AGREEMENT: RESHAPING MEXICO’S MIGRATION POLICIES 4 (2020), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/OneYearAfterUS-MexAgreement-ENFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRF-57U6].
174. For example, after reports of severe abuse and even deaths of Filipina domestic workers
at the hands of Kuwaiti employers, the Philippines negotiated a bilateral labor migration
agreement with Kuwait that included greater protections for Filipina workers. Ahmed Hagagy,
Kuwait To Regulate Employment of Philippine Domestic Workers After Reports of Abuse,
REUTERS (May 11, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://reut.rs/2jMSM2G [https://perma.cc/QZ2N-BYU2].
Central to this effort was the Philippines’ threat to cut off labor migration altogether. See id. For
an excellent analysis of the potential for bilateral agreements to protect domestic workers, see
Shayak Sarkar, The New Legal World of Domestic Work, 32 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 38–44
(2020).

LEE IN FINAL CHECK (DO NOT DELETE)

12/17/2021 3:08 PM

884

[Vol. 71:845

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

how the law regulates the transnational remittance economy. Yet, as
economic transactions, remittances remain undertheorized by legal
decision-makers and scholars. For this reason, it can be hard to figure
out how the descriptive picture provided in this Article fits into a
broader set of normative commitments—to figure out when law ought
to expand remittance markets and when it ought to curtail them.
My account prominently features state actors and public law. In
this regard, my account complements the descriptive picture painted
by the few legal scholars who address remittances as a migrant
phenomenon. Starting with the observation that the law typically
permits capital to flow freely across borders while clamping down on
migrant flow, Professor Shayak Sarkar argues that there are several
instances in which this distinction collapses upon itself.175 Specifically,
he provides a helpful taxonomy of laws across federal and state
regulatory contexts that constrain capital flows as attempts to disrupt
migrant mobility.176 Given that these laws arise within various branches
of government, Sarkar focuses on how these laws implicate different
constitutional doctrines, such as preemption and federalism,177 while
leaving aside the social meaning of remittances and the range of harms
that flow from different capital controls.
Other legal scholars have recognized the social meaning of
remittances, but most of their analysis focuses on the legal controls
imposed by governments in remittance-receiving countries. Professor
Ezra Rosser, for example, endorses a robust remittance economy and
encourages governments in remittance-receiving countries to give
significant weight to the views of communities most directly impacted
by remittances.178 Professor Ariel Stevenson similarly argues that tax
reforms that focus on the ability of governments in migrant-sending
(that is, remittance-receiving) countries to tax remittance income
better account for migrant well-being when compared to alternative
tax structures.179 Both of these accounts prioritize migrant well-being
and subjectivity, but neither considers how the state’s power to
regulate remittances fits within its power to regulate migration.180
175. Sarkar, supra note 7, at 805.
176. See id. at 808–35.
177. Id. at 836–58.
178. See Rosser, supra note 7, at 58.
179. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 102.
180. Professor Rosser explicitly brackets the question of how U.S. immigration policy figures
into debates about how legal controls ought to be calibrated over remittance flows even when he
offers a clear-eyed (and in my opinion, correct) critique that “remittance practices must be
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Sarkar, Rosser, and Stevenson have all created an important
foundation for engaging with the topic of how the law ought to
constrain remittance markets. And in many respects, my account
overlaps with theirs. Sarkar is right to suggest that sometimes capital
controls represent an extension of attempts to penalize noncitizens on
the basis of immigration status. This resonates with my focus on the
shared legislative origins of the MLCA (which empowers banks to
identify suspicious transactions) and IRCA (which empowers
employers to identify unauthorized workers). Similarly, Rosser and
Stevenson prioritize migrant well-being and argue in favor of
protecting cross-border familial love from intrusive state power, which
is effectively what I argue in characterizing remittances as a part of a
broader normalized state of family separation.
Yet missing from this picture is domestic law, especially of the law
enforcement variety. Domestic enforcement power is broad especially
when it advances immigration goals. Therefore, any attempts to
theorize remittances must account for domestic power and whether
any values might constrain the exercise of such power. In this Part, I
sketch out two types of theoretical commitments, one articulated in
terms of law and a second expressed in terms of political realities.
A. Legal Commitments
To the extent that the Supreme Court has theorized the legal
controls of transnational remittances, it has focused on remitters’
expectations of privacy for information submitted to banks and
financial institutions to use banking services. In United States v.
Miller,181 the Supreme Court held that bankers have no legitimate
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.182 Financial
statements and deposit slips—documents that can shine a light on
money laundering activities—reflect information that customers have
freely given away as a part of engaging in ordinary business

protected against regulatory practices or taxes that raise the cost of sending money to loved ones.”
Rosser, supra note 7, at 59. Similarly, Professor Stevenson recognizes that remittances arise out
of a workforce that lacks lawful status, but does not address the immigration policies creating that
reality. See Stevenson, supra note 7, at 102 n.4.
181. The Supreme Court initially held that the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act (“BSA”) were constitutional in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 52 (1974). United States v. Miller addressed the more specific question of whether the issuance
of a subpoena to obtain bank records created under the BSA violated the Fourth Amendment.
425 U.S. 435, 441 (1976).
182. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442, 446.
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transactions.183 Miller was important because it addressed the
constitutionality of the BSA’s recordkeeping requirements.184 By
putting bank records outside the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court effectively constitutionalized the legal infrastructure supporting
the modern anti-money laundering system.
A few years later, in Smith v. Maryland,185 the Supreme Court
addressed a similar Fourth Amendment challenge regarding phone
logs. Smith holds that callers have no expectation of privacy in phone
logs held by telephone companies.186 During this same period, the
Court also confronted gatekeeping questions in the context of
employer screening of workers. In De Canas v. Bica187 (decided the
same term as Miller), the Court holds that a California law prohibiting
employers from hiring noncitizens without lawful status was not
preempted under federal law at the time.188 All of these cases—Miller,
Smith, and De Canas—create a law enforcement landscape in which
Congress could enlist the help of banks and other third parties as
gatekeepers with little constitutional consequence. These cases help to
normalize economic practices in which individual actors—bank
customers and workers—share information with more powerful
economic actors—banks and employers—to relinquish control over
identifying information as a part of ordinary course of business.189
The gatekeeping dimension is a part of what makes anti-money
laundering laws unique as a regulatory tool. Like other laws grounded
in criminal and national security projects, enforcement officials are left
to decide by themselves how to strike the proper balance between
national security and criminal law enforcement goals and human costs.
But anti-money laundering laws operate in an enforcement landscape
in which a record has been gathered and curated by banks and other
financial entities, which makes it particularly easy for regulators to pick
and choose which targets to choose.
In this regard, the legal commitments governing anti-money
laundering law decisions are similar to those governing immigration
183. See id. at 442.
184. See id. at 441–43.
185. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
186. See id. at 737–38, 745.
187. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
188. Id. at 352–53, 365 (“It suffices that this Court decide at this time that the Court of Appeal
erred in holding that Congress in the INA precluded any state authority to regulate the
employment of illegal aliens.”).
189. See e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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enforcement decisions, which unfold in a context that treats state
power as “plenary.”190 Beginning in 1990, Congress made criminal law
rationales and tools a central part of its strategy to regulate
immigration flows.191 Congress began developing the legal
infrastructure to enlist the help of local police in the immigration
enforcement project.192 Concerns with terrorism added to the impulse
of expanding the reach of agencies and federal officials. After both the
World Trade Center bombing of 1993 and then the attacks on
September 11, 2001, Congress further empowered executive officials
to take broad and far-reaching measures to ensure the safety and
security of Americans. In particular, the September 11 attacks
prompted Congress to expand enforcement tools in ways that better
allowed for immigration laws to identify and apprehend potential
terrorists. In 2001, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act;193 in 2002, the
Homeland Security Act;194 and in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act.195 All of these laws drastically expand the
reach of agencies in fighting foreign terrorist threats through mix-andmatch enforcement settings and procedural protections.196 As a result,

190. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 604 (2013).
191. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. Professor
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues that the lawmaking of this period was defined by
immigration law absorbing and succumbing to criminal law penalties and logics. See García
Hernández, supra note 201, at 1361. This war on drugs justified creating a system of coordinated
enforcement across two systems—criminal law and immigration law—that had historically
remained separate. See id. at 1360–72.
192. While the local enforcement of immigration laws has forced many difficult constitutional
questions in the last decade, Congress created the statutory framework for this phenomenon in
1996. See Amada Armenta, From Sheriff’s Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening Immigrant
Status in a Tennessee Jail, 34 LAW & POL’Y 191, 192–93 (2012). In contrast to earlier eras in which
courts and the public viewed federal control over policing with skepticism, this new era tried to
naturalize federal participation in this traditionally local endeavor. Professor Trevor Gardner
explains, “Contemporary immigration enforcement is premised on a single, overarching
administrative system designed by the federal government to enforce federal immigration law. . . .
[A]nd it presumes the universal participation of state and local police departments.” See Gardner,
supra note 198, at 62.
193. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
194. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
195. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638
(2004).
196. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1100–20 (2008). And then in 2005, Congress
passed the REAL ID Act, which sets standards for states to issue driver’s licenses, again as a way
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Congress layered a national security agenda on top of an immigration
system that was already bending toward transnational crime control.197
The example of anti-money laundering laws actually bolsters the
case made by immigration scholars who characterize the modern
immigration enforcement system as one committed to ensuring and
maintaining “public security” through U.S. immigration laws.198 But
the example of anti-money laundering laws suggest that the breadth
and vagueness are built into the regulatory project itself. Broad
doctrines of deference combined with recordkeeping requirements
implemented by private gatekeepers blur the boundaries of power and
complicate the process of maintaining accountability in this system.
The development of anti-money laundering policies and antimigration
policies track one another, which sets a thicker foundation for
articulating critiques of public security enforcement goals. Public
security scholarship focuses on the historical role of the police,
antiterrorism campaigns, and xenophobia, which all converge in the
contemporary immigration system to identify and control a dangerous
“other” whose specter justifies the promulgation of far-reaching laws
and regulations.199 Professor Jennifer Chacón observes, “Irregular
migration, crime committed by non-citizens (or those perceived as noncitizens) and terrorist threats are all subsumed under the broad rubric
of national security threats.”200 Public security is an intentionally broad
and vague term meant to capture the unwieldy and often contradictory
enforcement policies that animate our immigration system.201
For the most part, legal scholars have used the concept of public
security to describe immigration or antimigration laws. Both
antimigration and anti-money laundering policies share a foundation
built on criminal law logic that was later expanded to address national

to prevent noncitizen terrorists from moving through society and the economy without some
degree of surveillance. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 70, at 1374–76. The REAL ID Act also
imposed stricter screening requirements on asylum seekers and vested greater discretion in the
hands of asylum judges. See id. at 1374–94.
197. See Sinnar, supra note 168, at 1397; Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security
President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1193–97 (2018).
198. See Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History
of Police Federalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2019); Chacón, supra note 161, at 1831.
199. See Gardner, supra note 198, at 1; Chacón, supra note 161, at 1831.
200. See Chacón, supra note 161, at 1831.
201. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1360, 1379–80 (2014); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 1281, 1298, 1330 (2010).
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security concerns.202 Together, they form a set of interlocking public
security policies in which expansive enforcement programs are justified
to pursue vaguely defined foreign criminals and terrorists. Both sets of
policies empower regulators with a wide degree of latitude to surveil,
partner with, and sometimes coerce private entities to identify
potentially dangerous targets.
B. Political Commitments
A part of the allure of remittance markets is the political appeal
of having markets solve global poverty, which deemphasizes the state’s
role in structuring markets.203 And a part of what makes anti-money
laundering laws so noteworthy as a governance strategy has been the
willingness of banks and other private financial institutions to
cooperate with regulators.204 The implication, of course, is that state
actors are dependent upon, and therefore must cede some degree of
power to, market actors. Given how much money flows out of the
United States to the Global South in the form of remittances, one could
argue that state actors should cede this power.
Viewed from the perspective of U.S. state actors, remittances
function as a kind of de facto version of foreign aid, a privatized
counterpart to state-to-state transfers that typically define foreign aid
packages. American foreign policy contains an antipoverty
component, which includes foreign aid packages to governments of
nations struggling to develop economic infrastructure or experiencing
instability wrought by unforeseen natural disasters.205 Rather than the
federal government drawing from its coffers to provide aid directly to
Mexico, the Philippines, and other countries in which demand for
migration opportunities to the United States remains high, the
domestic labor market creates opportunities for workers to realize
some of the same benefits indirectly.206 Like other forms of foreign aid,
202. See id. at 1869–73.
203. As Professor Ezra Rosser observes, part of the allure of fostering remittance markets is
the discursive emphasis on the “minimal role of the state and the power of people acting
independently to improve their own situation.” See Rosser, supra note 7, at 52. And to be clear,
Professor Rosser is critical of discourse uncritically embracing market-based solutions. See id. at
51–52.
204. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 64, at 888–93.
205. See George Ingram, What Every American Should Know About US Foreign Aid,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/what-everyamerican-should-know-about-us-foreign-aid [https://perma.cc/2B3G-78PT].
206. While remittances are subject to a different set of legal rules than foreign aid, they are
often understood in the public eye as interchangeable, or at least as complementary goods. See
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remittances advance U.S. policy goals like development and
humanitarian relief in receiving countries,207 but do so by harnessing
the labor of migrants within the United States to generate economic
and social goods in receiving countries.208
As a form of foreign aid, remittance markets offer an important
advantage to state-directed disbursements: remittances can mitigate
some of the problems of graft, which is a persistent obstacle to realizing
the benefits of foreign aid.209 With no meaningful way of monitoring
on-the-ground disbursement practices in developing nations, parties to
bilateral and multilateral agreements often contend with the reality
that corrupt local officials will siphon off payments as the aid makes its
way (if at all) to the intended beneficiaries.210 In this regard, harnessing
remittances for aid purposes largely avoids the graft problem because
wage earning transfers operate through private channels instead of by
entrusting governmental agencies in foreign countries with distribution
choices.
As a market-based solution for addressing global poverty,
propping up remittance markets does face some limitations. Given the
transnational familial context of remittances, such money transfers
most directly benefit relatives of remitters and sometimes community
members from their hometown or region. This therefore excludes
those who live in remittance-receiving countries lacking similar

Rohit Sudarshan, Remittances: A Complement to International Aid, PROSPER (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://csisprosper.com/2017/04/11/remittances-a-complement-to-international-aid [https://
perma.cc/X5YW-PMBX].
207. But see Rosser, supra note 7, at 5 (“Remittances . . . can alleviate some of the hardships
families face because of a lack of local opportunities in their home countries. Ultimately, while
remittances are ‘hot’ in development circles, remittances are by their very nature better suited to
reducing poverty than fueling lasting development.”).
208. See id. at 20 (“Remittances impact not only recipient families but also, in the aggregate,
have important and potentially negative consequences for the economies of remittance-receiving
countries.”).
209. See Ann M. Simmons, U.S. Foreign Aid: A Waste of Money or a Boost to World Stability?
Here Are the Facts, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fgglobal-aid-true-false-20170501-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/FR7C-7D89]. There is some
evidence of self-dealing in spending policies in remittance-receiving countries. In particular,
Mexico has a “remittance-matching” program in which local governments will match funds
remitted into Mexico from overseas. Simpser et al., supra note 146, at 63. Such programs have
benefitted local governments in ways that do not always directly benefit individuals, although the
broader observation remains that remittances that go directly into the hands of family members
reduces the likelihood of graft as compared to state-to-state transfers. See id.
210. Laura Iesue, The Alliance for Prosperity Plan: A Failed Effort for Stemming Migration,
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFS. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.coha.org/the-alliance-forprosperity-plan-a-failed-effort-for-stemming-migration [https://perma.cc/3Q72-D47Y].
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relationships with individuals in the United States.211 Moreover, the
range of uses for remittances is limited. Remittances typically can buy
food and clothing, start a business, pay for education, or buy or
renovate a house—which are all steps toward climbing out of poverty.
By contrast, foreign aid can serve a variety of purposes. Some forms of
aid seek to foster development or alleviate the exigencies of natural
disaster, which roughly correlate to the remittance narrative in that the
aid aims to serve the poorest and most vulnerable within the recipient
country.212 But other foreign policy goals tied up in other forms of aid
bear no resemblance to this story.213 Afghanistan and Israel routinely
receive significant disbursements of U.S. foreign aid.214 The aid has
been provided to advance national security and counterterrorism
goals,215 neither of which can plausibly be realized through
remittances.216 Finally, allowing money transfers to flow through
211. In Lauren Heidbrink’s ethnographic work on remittance channels between the United
States and Guatemala, some of her interview subjects in Guatemala expressed the view that
“[o]nly families benefit, not communities,” when it comes to remittance flows. See HEIDBRINK,
supra note 39, at 148–49. At the same time, other studies have shown that remittances can reach
even rural regions that lie beyond formal networks within the remittance-receiving country. In
their ethnographic study of the remittance economy in El Salvador, Professors Hernandez and
Coutin found that remittances from the United States “would reach everywhere, even rural areas,
and would go directly into the pockets of recipients.” Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 198.
212. See William Easterly, Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 23, 34–38
(2003).
213. Such as when the United States sends military equipment or other assets of value to the
recipient country.
214. Simmons, supra note 209.
215. See U.S. Relations with Afghanistan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 26, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm [https://perma.cc/MUN8-AYV2] (noting that
“Afghanistan remains an important partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism”);
Laurel E. Miller, The Challenges and the Benefits for U.S. National Security of Providing Foreign
Assistance to Afghanistan, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs 1–2 (May 9, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
testimonies/CT400/CT493/RAND_CT493.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H3U-DMSH] (noting that the
purpose of the War in Afghanistan “was not, of course, to make Afghanistan a nicer place for
Afghans but, rather, was to pursue U.S. national security interests in destroying al-Qaeda and—
because it had provided a safe haven to al-Qaeda—the Taliban”); Emma Green, Why Does the
United States Give So Much Money to Israel?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/united-states-israel-memorandum-ofunderstanding-military-aid/500192 [https://perma.cc/D2Q6-FJH7] (describing the U.S.-Israel
relationship as a “diplomatic and military alliance between the two countries [that] is
longstanding”).
216. If anything, government officials would argue that remittances undermine these goals
by funding transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. See INT’L MONETARY FUND,
MEXICO: DETAILED ASSESSMENT REPORT—ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 9 (2017), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2017/
405/002.2017.issue-405-en.xml [https://perma.cc/H7XD-NJH2]; David Cohen, Under Sec’y for
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private channels will make it harder to know how much has been
transferred.217
At the same time, when compared to more conventional state-tostate transfers of aid, remittances provide the executive branch with a
relative degree of autonomy in terms of interrupting the flow of cash
transfers. U.S. agencies commonly work with their state-level
counterparts in the receiving country—facilitating transnational
remittances as a form of foreign aid is purely a function of domestic
enforcement policy, especially as those policies impact immigration
and anti-money laundering objectives.218 By contrast, the president and
agencies, most notably the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
enjoy nearly unfettered discretion and autonomy in this enforcement
realm. As Professor Jennifer Gordon observes, policies governing
immigration can proceed on unilateral terms given that a country
decides for itself how it admits and welcomes newcomers.219 Although
Professor Gordon was making this argument in the context of
immigration policies, the same logic can be extended to domestic antimoney laundering controls over remittance flows. Compared to
bilateral tax treaties, which require negotiation with and the
cooperation of another country, anti-money laundering policies permit
officials to control flows from within the Treasury Department using
only domestic actors.
Importantly, the nature of state power in the context of regulating
remittances is often rendered invisible by the market logic that
dominates remittance debates. Policy advocates associated with both
the political left and right often invoke a kind of cost-benefit analysis

Terrorism & Fin. Intel., Remarks Before the Center for a New American Security on
“Confronting
New
Threats
in
Terrorist
Financing”
(Mar.
4,
2014),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx [https://perma.cc/R7GBSTHT].
217. This is something that has long concerned public law scholars in the context of
privatization schemes. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717,
722–23 (2010).
218. Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 583, 665–66 (2019).
219. See Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 1109, 1138 (2010) (“In the case of labor migration, . . . developed country
governments can legislate whatever sort of immigration program they desire without engaging
any developing countries at all.”); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The New Migration Law: Migrants,
Refugees, and Citizens in an Anxious Age, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 505 (2020) (“To satisfy
demand with workers with little formal education, destination country governments allow labor
migration, both lawful and outside the law—almost always acting unilaterally to get them without
explicitly cooperating with other countries.”).
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to support migration, which could easily be extended to support
broader remittance channels.220 The argument is that American
consumers benefit from migration through lower costs of goods and
services, and migrants benefit from access to labor markets offering
higher wages than what is available in their home countries.
Remittance markets reflect the predictable consequence of capital
flows from this kind of work, prompting arguments about the costs of
such an arrangement. Hence, the debate focuses on arguments that
immigrants take the jobs that Americans won’t (thereby mitigating
arguments about labor market costs),221 or that immigrants commit
fewer crimes than U.S.-born natives (thereby addressing concerns with
social costs).222
These are effective, pragmatic arguments that can help preserve
the limited protections and opportunities currently enjoyed by
vulnerable unauthorized migrants. But over the long-term, the market
logic of cost-benefit analysis—which runs throughout remittances
debates—runs the risk of distracting the public from the state’s role in
structuring these markets, whether by limiting opportunities to move
across borders freely or by turning a blind eye to private exploitation.
As Professors Ester Hernandez and Susan Bibler Coutin explain, “[b]y
defining remittances as altruistic gifts or unrequited transfers, central
banks ignore certain costs (such as alien-smuggling fees or fees charged
by money transfer agencies) born [sic] by migrants and make
remittances appear to be cost-free.”223 It valorizes what the market, and
specifically what the domestic labor market, can achieve at a global
level.

220. See Pia Orrenius, Benefits of Immigration Outweigh the Costs, GEORGE W. BUSH INST.:
THE
CATALYST
(Spring
2016),
https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/north-americancentury/benefits-of-immigration-outweigh-costs.html
[https://perma.cc/Y6VZ-329J];
Tom
Jawetz, Building a More Dynamic Economy: The Benefits of Immigration, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/building-dynamiceconomy-benefits-immigration [https://perma.cc/MK7U-WMNA].
221. See Julia Preston, Immigrants Aren’t Taking Americans’ Jobs, New Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/immigrants-arent-takingamericans-jobs-new-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/48P4-T27E] (presenting the progressive
argument that “immigrants contribute to the economy whether they are here legally or not, by
providing labor for American employers and opening businesses that create jobs for Americans
rather than taking them”).
222. See Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067,
2072 (2017) (“[N]on-citizens commit fewer crimes and reoffend less often than citizens.”); see also
Sklansky, supra note 152, at 193 (“[T]he rise of crimmigration cannot be attributed to a growing
problem of crime committed by noncitizens . . . .”).
223. See Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 43, at 201.
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The “markets will save us” mindset that focuses on the costs and
benefits of allowing migrants to remit some of their wages to support
family members avoids the obvious point that certain jobs are so
exploitative that they simply should not exist.224 That is an issue that
should be answered by state, not market, actors. For this reason,
debates about mass legalization programs implicate remittance
markets. Banks that cancel individual accounts or that shut down entire
branches exacerbate inequalities because electronic money transfers
remain one of the only opportunities for migrants to stay connected
with family members. But loosening restrictions on travel across
borders can take the pressure off of banks. If given the ability to move
back and forth across borders, migrants can hand over and share
remittances in person, thereby freeing banks to focus on activities that
truly signal or support dangerous behaviors such as drug trafficking or
terrorism. In the United States, the only legal status that provides near
unfettered mobility is citizenship, and to a certain extent, lawful
permanent residence.
A mass legalization program would begin to correct the cramped
vision of family reunification that immigration policy currently
embraces.225 Recent mass legalization bills include the opportunity to
gain these statuses usually after a conditional period, which would not
only provide some measure of security for migrants living in the United
States, but would also provide greater certainty for the relationships
between migrants and their family members in other countries.
IV. ECONOMIC EXPRESSIONS OF AFFINITY IN RELATED CONTEXTS
The remittance economy demonstrates how migrants stay
connected across borders through economic means. This final Part
explores how legal controls outside of the banking and financial
context might account for this reality. Specifically, I focus on the
meaning that legal and political decisionmakers attribute to
remittances.

224. See Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1543, 1571–72 (2014).
225. See generally JOANNA DREBY, DIVIDED BY BORDERS: MEXICAN MIGRANTS AND
THEIR CHILDREN (2010) (exploring stories of migrant parents and the ways in which their
children influenced their decision to relocate as well as the outcomes of these choices).
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A. Family Unity
Physical togetherness and family unity form the basis of critiques
of immigration enforcement policies designed to separate migrant
families. But in a world of limited mobility and increased dependence
on economic expressions of affinity and support, the remittance
economy requires considering whether there might be forms of family
separation beyond physical disruptions that the law should target.
Immigration law has historically relied on family law principles to
develop family unification theories. Family unification has figured into
the constitutional contours of immigration law since at least the late
nineteenth-century. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court recognized and consolidated a general immigration
power in the hands of Congress and the president,226 and in the early
part of the twentieth century, the Court took similar steps with regards
to administrative agencies.227 The Court accomplished this through a
series of decisions upholding the constitutionality of various Chinese
exclusion laws.228
Importantly, despite those decisions, which were grounded in
sweeping ideas about deference to Congress and the president, notions
of family unity could blunt the force of the worst impulses of those
laws.229 Dean Kerry Abrams points to a number of lower court
decisions in which judges read into the Chinese exclusion laws what
was effectively a family unity exclusion: “The common law theory of
marital unity was still so powerful that family unity was treated with
extraordinary deference—even in the face of an articulation of the
immigration power that made the state’s authority sound absolute.”230

226. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 466–67 (2009).
227. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative
State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 26–30, 35–38, 41, 43 (2002) (detailing how the Supreme Court
developed several facets of administrative law, including deference to administrative factfinders,
through several immigration cases in the early nineteenth and late twentieth centuries).
228. See Lucy Salyer, Captives of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws,
1891-1905, 76 J. AM. HIST. 91, 114–15 (1989).
229. See Kerry Abrams, The Rights of Marriage: Obergefell, Din, and the Future of
Constitutional Family Law, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 561–63 (2018).
230. Abrams, supra note 162, at 255. In one notable example, the foreign-born Chinese wife
and child of a Chinese merchant challenged their exclusion. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. 398, 398
(C.C.D. Or. 1890). And while the exclusion law specifically exempted “merchants” from the ban,
the law was silent as to spouses and children. Id. at 398–99. The court in that case interpreted the
law in a way that suggested the merchant had a “natural right” to the “company of the one, and
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Physical togetherness was assumed to be the defining feature of
forming and belonging to a family—living and loving together in the
same household. Most recently, family unity formed the basis of a
critique of immigration enforcement measures that caused family
separation at the U.S.–Mexico border. As part of its anti-smuggling and
antitrafficking enforcement policies, the Trump administration
separated children from adult guardians at the border ostensibly to
protect children from dangerous or predatory adults.231 For many, the
nature of the harm was obvious and hardly worth exploring: denying
parents access to their children violated the basic human right to care
for and live with their children. While these enforcement practices
undeniably implicated human rights frameworks, they also violated a
key normative commitment of immigration law—that immigration law
should recognize and account for familial relationships when allocating
benefits and imposing sanctions.
Perhaps it is because physical togetherness is such an obviously
defining feature of the family unit that courts, lawmakers, and
regulators have spent such little time defining its importance. The
implicit goal of family-based admissions categories is for noncitizens to
live with citizen or lawful permanent resident family members. The
entire suite of family-based admissions categories reflects this
principle, as do other categories such as derivative beneficiaries.232 At
the same time, the broader social science literature documenting how
migrants experience the adverse effects of both antimigration and antimoney laundering policies highlights the limits of legal categories. The
concept of remitting rights does not currently afford courts the
doctrinal cover to limit executive overreach in its administration of
national security programs.
For legal scholars, then, the social realities and meaning
surrounding the remittance economy present an invitation to critique
the migration/capital distinction itself. Feminist scholarship provides a
the care and custody of the other,” which could not be displaced unless Congress was absolutely
clear with its intention to do so. Id. at 399–400.
231. Cf. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1164–65 (S.D. Cal.
2018) (summarizing the claims against the government as separating parents “from their children
upon arriving at our nation’s border without any determination they were unfit or presented a
danger to their children”).
232. See Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV.
629, 682 (2014) (identifying family reunification, or the ability to live with family, as an important
value of immigration law); Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the
Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 511, 511–13 (1995) (stating that family reunification
principles influence immigration law and outlining tiers of family preferences in immigration law).
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rough roadmap as to how such an intervention might unfold. Scholars
like Peggie Smith,233 Vicki Schultz,234 Nancy Staudt,235 and more
recently Noah Zatz,236 helpfully critique how conventional definitions
of work render caregiving duties invisible. For my purposes, the
significance is that market activities that trigger legal protections,
namely work, are socially constructed and obfuscate historically
unequal relationships based in gender, race, and class. A similar
critique applies to family unity. Immigration provisions covering
removal cancellation and admission already contain pockets
recognizing economic obligations grounded in affinity. The working
pieces to build out an infrastructure already exist. Just because family
separation harms are triggered by the disruption of physical proximity
does not mean that such disruptions are the only kinds of family
separation that merit legal protection, especially in light of the broader
antimigration policies governing migrant lives.
The realities of physical and geographic distance mean that
migrants rely on remittances as a key method of expressing affinity or
love for family members. Centering the role that remittances play in
the lives of migrants illustrates how family unity principles are given
expression beyond physical proximity. Remittances offer one way for
migrants to remain connected with loved ones in their countries of
origin. Money transfers operate alongside text messages, video calls,
and other technological innovations that enable remitters to foster and
maintain emotional intimacy across the globe.237
Immigration laws restrict migrant mobility and prevent them from
visiting family members. Anti-money laundering laws constrain the
ability of migrants to send remittances to those same family members.
Legal constructions of family unity, then, reflect the imprimatur of two
overlapping and complementary sets of laws—those governing

233. See Peggie R. Smith, Laboring for Child Care: A Consideration of New Approaches To
Represent Low-Income Service Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583, 591 (2006) (noting that
“child care is frequently dismissed as a form of emotional work that lacks economic visibility and
value”).
234. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1899–1900 (2000) (arguing
that society fails to value housework, childcare, and other work performed at home).
235. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1573–74 (1996) (arguing
that society fails to formally acknowledge, and thus value, “women’s work” like housework and
childrearing).
236. See Noah D. Zatz, Supporting Workers by Accounting for Care, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 45, 58–59 (2011) (criticizing conceptions of work that encompass only paid employment as
excluding and rendering invisible the work of family caretakers).
237. HEIDBRINK, supra note 39, at 49.
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migration and those governing capital. Put in slightly different terms,
the harms of family separation operate on a spectrum in which some
forms of separation are physical while others are more indirect, as in
the remittances context.238 Expanding out to include remittance flows
further develops this idea that even ostensibly voluntary forms of
separation—such as knowingly and willingly leaving one’s family
behind to enter the United States for work—inflicts a similar, albeit
less offensive, form of moral harm compared to family separation at
the U.S.–Mexico border.
The remittance economy deepens the understanding of how those
who lack or possess only tenuous legal statuses experience family
separation. There are instances in which noncitizens in the United
States are arbitrarily barred from remitting wages. Banks shut down
individual accounts because of the frequency of cash deposits239 or shut
down entire branches because operating in high trafficking and
laundering zones like border communities is more trouble than it is
worth.240 Families often pool resources to invest in a single family
member’s journey to the United States so that they can work and send
remittances. It is a survival strategy. As beneficiaries of family
resources, migrants who find themselves unable to or deterred from
remitting wages can experience trauma similar to survivor’s guilt.241
Recognizing the affinity-based elements of remittances brings that
account in line with significant pockets of immigration law that rely on
similar principles to shape the rights and benefits available to migrants.
Consider In re Gonzalez Recinas,242 a well-known case examining the

238. See Lee, supra note 17, at 2359–63 (describing how anti-money laundering laws hinder
sending remittances to family abroad).
239. Cf. McKendry, supra note 127 (noting that some banks are reluctant to take on “high
risk” customers like those involved with the “marijuana business”); Emily Feldman, The U.S.Mexico Border Is Becoming a Banking Desert, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 30, 2018 10:42
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/the-u-s-mexico-border-is-becominga-banking-desert [https://perma.cc/48P6-5JBV]. One GAO report found that money launderingrelated risks likely played a significant role in driving bank branch closures in the U.S.–Mexico
border region. This study surveyed banks and found that a significant percentage of banks in the
Southwest region reported terminating cash-intensive small business accounts as well as accounts
involving money services and other businesses involved in cross-border activity. GAO, BANK
SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra note 132, at 19–20..
240. See GAO, BANK SECRECY ACT: DERISKING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, supra
note 132, at 11–16, 31–33 (describing the difficulties of banking in border communities and
concluding that the cost of complying with anti-money laundering laws can contribute to bank
closures).
241. See Heidbrink, supra note 51, at 278.
242. In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002).
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kinds of equitable factors that might support an affirmative grant of
canceling removal.243 It examined whether Ariadna Recinas, a
removable noncitizen, was entitled to “cancellation of removal,” a
form of relief that allows a removable migrant to remain in the United
States.244 As part of its hardship assessment, the Board of Immigration
Appeals considered Recinas’s business with two employees and her
automobile ownership.245 Importantly, this discussion was embedded
within a broader analysis of how Recinas’s deportation and subsequent
collapse of her business would impact her children within the United
States due to her inability to support them financially.246 In other
words, the Board considered Recinas’s investments in the United
States to be equity gained through time spent supporting her family.
Uprooting her would also harm her two children.
Another example is the affidavit of support requirement that all
sponsors must complete in order to sponsor family members as a part
of the visa application process.247 Sponsors must promise to provide
financial support for their noncitizen family members to reduce the
likelihood that new members strain public resources by slipping into
poverty.248 These affidavits amount to legally enforceable promises to
support and ensure the economic well-being of visa recipients.
Moreover, the only category of recipients for whom affidavits are
required are family-based recipients.249 Both the cancellation of
removal and affidavit of support illustrate the different ways that law
currently recognizes the significance of economic support in assessing
the legitimacy of familial bonds. The example of anti-money
laundering laws highlights how Treasury officials also use financial
records and economic activity in ways that allow them to track and
observe familial relationships with and among noncitizens in the
United States.

243. See id. at 468–73.
244. See id. at 467–68.
245. Id. at 470.
246. Id. at 471.
247. See Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/step-1submit-a-petition/affidavit-of-support.html [https://perma.cc/7JYR-89V4].
248. See id.
249. Those who seek to sponsor noncitizens in other categories such as employment and
diversity may be required to do so at the discretion of immigration officials but are not required
to do so by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1) (setting forth terms for a sponsor’s affidavit of
support).
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B. Wage Earnings
Remittances are often the product of wage earnings. For this
reason, the regulatory influence of anti-money laundering laws
implicates the various workplace laws that protect migrants in the
United States. A significant strand of legal scholarship focuses on
migrants as workers and workplace laws.250 Much of this scholarship is
heavily informed by economic analysis and dominated by practical
questions about how to balance the societal benefits of new migrant
workers against the costs borne by native-born workers.
Unsurprisingly, the focus has been on empirical questions: whether
migrants will function as supplements or substitutes to native-born
workers;251 whether the economic contributions of immigrant workers
offset the dilution of public resources;252 and whether these economic
impacts are differently experienced by native-born workers across
regions of the country.253
Those who theorize immigrant work and advance normative
claims quite sensibly try to meld claims for migrant inclusion into this
labor-centric view of immigration law. This body of work highlights the
economic productivity of migrants and explores whether and how the
economic interests of migrant workers meld with those of native

250. See generally, e.g., Shannon Gleeson & Kati L. Griffith, Employers as Subjects of the
Immigration State: How the State Foments Employment Insecurity for Temporary Immigrant
Workers, 46 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 92 (2021) (arguing that migrants with temporary protected
status have more difficulty obtaining and maintaining employment than do permanent residents
due to stringent bureaucratic requirements); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship,
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007) (advocating for transnational labor citizenship, which “would link
permission to enter the United States in search of work to membership in cross-border worker
organizations,” not to a specific employer). I have also contributed to this conversation. See
generally Stephen Lee, Screening for Solidarity, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2013) (arguing that
migrant workers who assert labor claims should receive preference for immigration benefits).
251. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the
Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9
(2008) (discussing empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant labor does not substitute for
native labor).
252. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of Emigration
and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 271–74 (2006) (discussing dueling empirical studies
concerning burdens that immigration places on the welfare state).
253. See Jennifer Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality at the Intersection of Work and
Immigration, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 125, 138–43 (2012) [hereinafter Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric
and Reality] (discussing more particularized effects of immigration and the need for additional
study). See generally GIOVANNI PERI, THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN RECESSION AND
ECONOMIC EXPANSION
(2010),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KC4D-JXFM] (discussing the effects of immigration on employment and
income).
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workers.254 Both advocates255 and regulators256 have understandably
focused on notions of economic productivity to advance arguments in
favor of mass legalization programs because migrants have “earned”
legalization.257
The reality of remittances and the law regulating the transnational
economy exposes precisely the point at which these sorts of arguments
become politically vulnerable. The broad and inclusive nature of labor
protections are negotiated and implemented within a political
environment with streaks of nativism and nationalism.258 Those on the
political right often invoke nativist sentiments to argue against
increasing migration opportunities. One could imagine a similar sort of
argument that remittance flows represent capital leaving the United
States, thereby representing migrants’ economic disloyalty toward
their adopted home.259 This reality highlights the ease with which labor-

254. From the perspective of migrant plaintiffs, this has been a productive legal pursuit given
that several courts and agencies extend workplace laws to workers regardless of immigration
status. But there are some limitations to what this labor-centric approach to immigration law can
provide, and the realities surrounding the remittance economy highlight these limitations. See
Stephen Lee, Undocumented Civil Procedure, in A CRITICAL GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE
(Brooke Coleman, Suzette Malveaux, Portia Pedro & Elizabeth Porter eds., forthcoming 2021).
255. See generally, e.g., Giovanni Peri, The Economic Benefits of Immigration, BERKELEY
REV. LATIN AM. STUDS., Fall 2013, at 14 (discussing economic benefits of immigration).
256. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Important Role of Immigrants
in Our Economy, Remarks at the 2013 Annual Gala of the Georgia Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce
(May
18,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch051813laahtm
[https://perma.cc/55K3-A2E9] (discussing the economic benefits of immigration).
257. Indeed, despite internal struggles and dissension, over the last couple of decades,
mainstream labor organizations have embraced the interests of migrant workers. See Janice Fine
& Daniel J. Tichenor, A Movement Wrestling: American Labor’s Enduring Struggle with
Immigration, 1866–2007, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 84, 111 (2009).
258. See George J. Sánchez, Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in
Late Twentieth Century America, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1009, 1021 (1997).
259. In a satirical essay, Professor Yxta Murray voices a set of recommendations to President
Trump as a journalist with right-wing extremist tendencies. Yxta Maya Murray, A Modest Memo,
22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 187, 187 (2017). On the subject of remittances specifically, Professor
Murray channels this position to address the position that “remittances to Mexican family
members qualify as symbols of love and utter sacrifice on the part hard-working economic
refugees.” Id. at 207. Imploring President Trump to lump remittances into his broader project of
attacking Mexican Americans, Murray reminds President Trump that he “will help us see
remittances not as icons of loving-kindness, but rather as polluted, stolen property.” Id.
Embedded within Professor Murray’s satirical analysis is fodder for real-life restrictionists
pressing the case for expanding enforcement efforts against migrants. See Matthew O’Brien,
Spencer Raley & Casey Ryan, The United States Loses $150 Billion Annually in Remittances,
FAIR (May 2019), https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/united-states-loses-150billion-annually-remittances [https://perma.cc/Y32X-628B].
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centric accounts of unauthorized work can slide into unproductive
debates about economic nationalism.
The restrictionist approach to labor migration partially reflects the
absence of a compelling normative vision for how the law should count
migrants’ economic contributions. Theories about the legal benefits of
earning wages do not fully account for spending choices made by
migrants. This economic security, in turn, enables workers to
recirculate their earnings through the consumption of goods and
services thereby growing the national economy. For migrant workers
embedded within transnational families, the recirculation of earnings
is expressed through remittances, which benefits the economies of
other countries.
Debates in this area are often framed in terms of identifying the
winners and losers among the dominant economic interests in the
United States. In reductive terms, both migration (especially
unauthorized migration) and trade benefit American businesses by
giving them access to cheaper sources of labor.260 Similarly, both
migration and trade create benefits for American consumers when
businesses pass along the costs savings to the public. Assessing the
economic consequences of migration and trade becomes more
complicated when considering native-born workers. Increases in
migration and expanded reliance on imported goods can cause certain
labor markets to shrink in the United States, hence harming the
economic interests of native-born workers, which places workers on a
different footing than businesses and consumers. As a result, much of
the research is empirical: Are migrant workers supplements or
substitutes for native-born workers?261 Do the economic contributions
of migrants offset the increase in public expenditures? Are these gains
and losses spread evenly across the nation or only regionally?262
The reality of remittances can also complicate normative
commitments that might otherwise be obvious. While there is much in
the economic lives of migrants that remains to be theorized, one way
forward is to account for the social meaning of work for migrants more
explicitly and to let that social reality inform the substance and reach

260. See Motomura, supra note 219; KIMBERLY CLAUSING, OPEN: THE PROGRESSIVE CASE
FREE TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND GLOBAL CAPITAL 141–42 (2019); Gordon, supra note
219, at 1131.
261. See Chang, supra note 251 (discussing empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant
labor does not substitute for native labor).
262. See, e.g., Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 255, at 140–41.
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of workplace protections. For example, a number of legal scholars
theorize core employment protections like minimum wage laws in
terms of social equality. These social equality scholars have provided a
theoretical base that could be expanded to account for remittance flow.
Several scholars argue that employment protection generally, and
minimum wage protections specifically, not only protect workers
against wage theft, but they also operate to ensure a degree of social
equality.263 In the context of wage protections, Professor Brishen
Rogers argues that “[g]iven the all-too-recent historical context of
slavery and serfdom, the very payment of wages is a powerful
indication of workers’ moral equality.”264
At the same time, scholarship in this area does not explicitly
contemplate the transnational dimensions of immigrant work that
transpires in the United States. Social equality scholars have embraced
concepts that are tethered to a purely domestic life. For example,
Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos explains that the social equality
principle “demands that inequalities in economic position (which may
be beneficial or inevitable) not be automatically replicated into
inequalities in other areas of life that are key to participation in
society.”265 Thus, a worker’s relatively modest economic success should
not lock in those disadvantages in terms of “access to the political
process, community self-government, the process of petitioning for
redress of grievances, or the protections of the law.”266
Still, the basic contours of the social equality account provide an
opening for thinking through what equality means to workers
embedded within transnational families. Returning to Rogers, he
helpfully argues that wage protections provide workers with “greater
self-respect as well as more time for leisure, caregiving, or other
activities through which to achieve self-realization.”267 But realizing
these benefits in transnational familial relationships would unfold
differently than for workers who live with or near family members and
263. See Rogers, supra note 224, at 1570–88 (arguing that “minimum wage laws help ensure
decent work and social equality for low-wage workers”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law
and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 243–73 (2013) (arguing that “employment law rules
pervasively implicate questions of social equality” and analyzing employment law through a social
equality lens); Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to
Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 23–27 (discussing the civil rights justifications
for the minimum wage).
264. Rogers, supra note 224, at 1571.
265. Bagenstos, supra note 263, at 236.
266. Id. at 237.
267. Rogers, supra note 224, at 1592.
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loved ones. For many migrant workers, leisure would not involve
sharing meals or taking walks together (at least not with family
members who remain in the migrant’s country of origin). It would more
likely involve using wages to pay for electronic devices or Internet
services that could facilitate videocalls or remitting some wages so
family members can gain similar access.268 A social equality vision of
the law already meshes well with scholarly accounts of antimigration
policies. A number of legal scholars have already demonstrated how
immigration enforcement exacerbates inequality in the wage context.
Marrying these accounts to anti-money laundering policies would help
complete the picture of how migrant workers experience inequality as
workers: that even if they are able to secure all of the wages they are
owed, they face additional costs and indignities in translating those
wages into benefits measured through leisure and caregiving. Because
migrant workers are more likely to be embedded within transnational
families than native-born workers, they are disproportionately
impacted by the costs created by anti-money laundering practices in
supporting family members.
A less extreme version of this same argument might pressure
consumers and workers within the United States to buy American in
certain instances. Even if legal tools like tariffs have a spotty or
unsavory historical record, the general idea that law might be used to
encourage spending within the American economy could be
defensible. But even if such an idea is generally defensible, it is hard to
make that case for remittances. It feels odd to demand that migrant
workers spend their money within the United States when the reason
that many remit wages is because immigration laws do not create
meaningful opportunities for them to regularize their status or to admit
their family members.269 This is not just the case for unauthorized
migrants, but also for lawful permanent residents and citizen migrants
who are subject to long wait times for visas for family members.
The empirical consequences of the remittance economy are less
apparent because the negative impacts on Americans are less visible.
Increased migration, especially of low-skilled workers, harms nativeborn workers by expanding the supply of workers and rendering wages

268. See Valerie Francisco, ‘The Internet is Magic’: Technology, Intimacy and Transnational
Families, 41 CRITICAL SOCIO. 173, 175 (2015) (describing how transnational families use
computer technology to keep in touch).
269. See id. (framing the need for immigrants to resort to computer technology to keep in
touch as a result of immigration laws that prevent in-person interaction).
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stagnant, at least in industries where migrant workers serve as
substitutes. By contrast, the harm from remittances is much more
diffuse because it affects U.S. businesses and consumers rather than
workers. The argument here is that wages or earnings that flow out of
the country could have been spent or reinvested in the United States,
thereby expanding the consumer base for U.S. businesses. There might
be some truth to this claim, but the consequences are much harder to
identify. While some U.S. businesses might lose out on migrants’
disposable income, others, like the financial services sector or
transportation services (for those who are carrying or paying others to
carry remittances to family members), certainly benefit.
Ultimately, there many reasons to support using the law to protect
migrant wage earnings. But most of the thinking in this arena focuses
on protecting wage earnings without taking into account whether and
how these wage earnings end up in the pockets of a migrant’s family.
This focuses on a migrant’s livelihood without considering the rest of a
migrant’s life. For migrants, giving meaning to one’s body, mind, and
heart is a project that requires disaggregation and that unfolds across
multiple countries. Blending analyses of anti-money laundering and
antimigration laws with family law and employment law can help
reveal the quiet violence of moving across a border in one direction to
send funds back in the other direction.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the centrality of anti-money
laundering policies in regulating migration. Viewing the broader legal
system from this vantage point illustrates that anti-money laundering
and antimigration policies developed in tandem to ensure a broadly
conceived notion of public security against vague threats of foreign
elements. Together, these legal tools enable legal and political actors
to expand their reach not only over transnational remittance flows, but
also over the conditions of admission and deportation of migrants. The
harms emerge in remittance deserts and are experienced as the loss of
economic expressions of affinity. In short, these laws work together to
regulate the lives and livelihood of migrants. The harms of this system
have mostly eluded legal scholars, so this Article presents the
opportunity to contribute to important and ongoing discussions central
to reform projects in the immigration law space. Finally, this Article
shows that family separation harms operate along a spectrum and have
become normalized in the modern era. One way that advocates and
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legal decision-makers can slowly begin the process of integrating family
separation into the legal infrastructure of U.S. financial institutions is
to accord proper weight to the social meaning of remittances—namely,
the long-distance, digitized expressions of familial relationships meant
to preserve an emotional bond that one day may be enjoyed in person.

